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NOTES
The Federal Estate Tax and Discretionary Powers to Invade
Trust Corpus or Accumulate Income
Common trust provisions give the trustee discretionary power to pay
over trust corpus to the beneficiary, or power to accumulate income. Such
provisions give administrative flexibility, making funds available to the
beneficiary in an emergency, or allowing the trustee to save for the future.
At the same time, the trustee is given discretionary power over the re-
spective interests of life tenant and remainderman. Corpus invasion will
leave less for succeeding interests, income accumulation more. By naming
himself trustee of an inter vivos trust, the settlor can maintain control over
the ultimate destination of the res, as between the various beneficiaries.
On the other hand, the trustee's "power" may be so limited by the terms
of the trust as to make its exercise tantamount to duty. Where the settlor
transfers property upon trust, he may in this manner retain almost the
equivalent of a right of revocation through a power of invasion in the
trustee, exercisable in his, the settlor's favor. Possibilities of estate tax
avoidance 1 in such devices have made them a subject of Congressional
and judicial attention. Exploration of tax litigation involving these "dis-
cretionary powers" gives some indication of the extent to which they
perform a utilitarian trust function, rather than one of tax avoidance pure
and simple.
APPLICABLE CODE SECTIONS
Inter vivos trusts of this nature may be subject to estate tax under
several Revenue Code 2 provisions, which are in essence only elaborations
of the basic concept that transfers taking effect in enjoyment at or after
death should be included in the decedent's gross estate.3 Section 811 (d) 4
provides for inclusion in the gross estate of property interests transferred
at any time, by trust or otherwise, when the enjoyment thereof is subject
to change at decedent's death by the exercise of a power to alter, amend,
revoke, or terminate. The trust corpus might also be included in the
settlor's estate under § 811 (c) ; 5 as a transfer intended to take effect at
death; or one subject to a retained right to designate who will enjoy the
property or income therefrom; or as a transfer with possession or enjoy-
ment of the property, or a right to the income therefrom, retained for life.
An unqualified power to invade corpus retained by the settlor is the
equivalent of a power to alter or amend,6 by the exercise of which enjoy-
1. Generally on estate tax avoidance by means of trusts, see 1 PAUL, FEDERAL
ESTATE AND GIRT TAXATION § 108 (1942) ; James, Family Trusts and Federal Taxes,
9 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 427 (1942) ; Leaphart, The Use of Trusts to Escape the linpo-
sition of Federal Income and Estate Taxes, 15 CORN. L. Q. 587 (1930) ; PAUL, STUDIES
IN FEDERAL TAXATION 9, 42-66 (1937).
2. U. S. INTERNAL REVENUE CODE.
3. This concept goes back to the original Act of 1916, § 202(b).
4. INT. REV. CODE §811(d).
5. INT. IZEV. CODE § 811 (c).
6. Est. of Charles B. DuCharme, 7 T. C. 705 (1946), rev'd on other grounds,
164 F. 2d 959 (6th Cir. 1947), aff'd on. rehearing, 169 F. 2d 76 (6th Cir. 1948). Cf.
Est. of Henry J. Mollenburg, CCH 1947 TC MEM. DEC. SERV. 16183(M) (1947)
(power to terminate as well as to invade); see Est. of Oscar H. Perrin, P-H 1944
TC MEm!. DEC. SERV. 44,076, pp. 44-249 (1944). Cf. Union Trust Co. v. Driscoll,
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ment of interests created by an inter vivos trust may be changed, either
by shifting the interest of the various beneficiaries 7 or otherwise.8 Such
interests will be included in the settlor's estate under § 811(d). Logically,
an unlimited power to accumulate income could be considered as a power
to change enjoyment under § 811(d), but it could also fit in under
§ 811 (c) as a power to designate who is to enjoy the prqperty or income
therefrom. The question of which subsection is properly applicable raises
some exceedingly nice problems which, though fundamental, have so far
received little consideration by the courts.
It is questionable whether a power to accumulate should render an
inter vivos trust created before March, 1931 includable in the settlor's
estate. If it be considered as a power to designate the enjoyer of the
income it is clear that estate taxation would no result. This limitation
would not apply, however, if the trust is treated under § 811(d), as was
done with a power to reallocate income between various life beneficiaries
in Comrm'r v. Bridgeport City Trust Co.'1 Such reasoning of course
leaves the meaning of § 811 (c) much restricted or at least unclear." - Fur-
ther, it means that the reservation of the whole life estate might escape
estate taxation, but the addition of a superfluous power to reallocate the
income or redesignate the receivers thereof might produce an opposite
result.'
2
Under § 811(d), however, difficult computation problems arise. The
plain meaning of the section indicates that only the interest the enjoyment
138 F. 2d 152 (3d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 321 U. S. 764 (1944) (power to change
shares of beneficiaries). Often it may be more useful for purposes of clarity to think
of an invasion power as a power to terminate, e. g., where invasion for a particular
beneficiary is limited to his share of the res. The difference is of course merely
one of terminology and analysis since the result will be the same in either event.
Cf. Comm'r v. Est. of Holmes, 326 U. S. 480 (1946).
7, Cases cited note 6 supra.
8: Situations where enjoyment could be changed without shifting the interests
of beneficiaries are conceivable. For example a trust, the ircome to go .to A for life,
and at his death the corpus to pass as he may by will appoint or in default of appoint-
ment to his heirs. The exercise of a corpus invasion power by the trustee in favor
of A could adversely affect an expectancy at most, However, the life tenant's
enjoyment will have been accelerated. This is another instance where the use of
"terminate" seems more accurate than "alter" or "amend." It will be noted that
upon the above facts the trust might well be subject to inclusion under the Hallock
principle (see notes 50, 68 infra).
9. This is the date of the famous Joint Resolutions of Congress, passed to
abrogate the decision of May v. Heiner, 281 U. S. 238 (1930) (inter vivos trust not
includable because settlor reserved income for life), which were held to have no
retroactive effect by the Supreme Court in Hassett v. Welch, 303 U. S. 303 (1938).
This particular part of § 811(c) is a portion of the statutory enactment of the Joint
Resolutions. Since 1940 there has been considerable controversy over whether May v.
Heiner "survived" the Supreme Court's opinion in Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S.
106 (1940) (see note 50 infra). The question may be decided this term in two cases
in which certiorari was granted a year ago: Comm'r v. Est. of F. L. Church, 161 F. 2d
11 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. granted, 331 U. S. 802 (1947) ; Comm'r v. Spiegel's Est., 159
F. 2d 257 (7th Cir. 1947), cert. granted, 331 U. S. 798 (1947). See CCH FED.
ESTATE & GIFT TAx SERv. f 9800, Report 58 (1948).
10. 124 F. 2d 48 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 316 U. S. 672 (1942) ; cf. Comm'r
v. Hofheimer's Est., 149 F. 2d 733, 736 (2d Cir. 1948); Est. of E. L. Ballard, 47
B. T. A. 784, 792 (1942). But cf. Est. of E. E. Bradley, 1 T. C. 518, 519-527 (1943).
11. It would be hard to imagine a clearer equivalent of a power to designate who
shall enjoy income, than a power to allocate or one to reallocate income between cer-
tain named beneficiaries.
12. See Est. of E. L. Ballard, 47 B. T. A. 784, 792 (1942). The fault for this
anomaly may properly be said to lie primarily in cases like May v. Heiner and Hassett
v. Welch.
of which is changed by the exercise of the power, falls into the decedent's
gross estate.13 Thus a power of income accumulation will cause inclusion
only to the estimated or actual value of the life estate (i. e., the income
therefrom). Conversely, a power to invade corpus may be said to affect
the enjoyment only of the remaining interests. This problem is rare
because normally both types of powers will appear in the same trust.
14
It is therefore possible to find the commissioner arguing that a post-
1931 trust should be included in the settlor's gross estate in its entirety,
because a power to accumulate income has been retained, which under
§ 811(c) renders the whole trust subject to the estate tax. The argument
was successful in Industrial Trust Co. v. Comm'r.'L. This case seems to
be contrary in principle to Comm'r v. Bridgeport City Trust Co,' 6 but
there is more in the problem than a mere difference of opinion between
circuits. The matter is apparently complicated by the way in which the
cases have been presented by counsel. Furthermore, it has been suggested
that subsections (c) and (d) are not mutually exlsie1
While these problems have not received definitive judicial treatment,
one may safely generalize to the extent of saying that if the settlor has
at his death an unlimited power to invade corpus or to accumulate income,
some part of the trust property will fall into his gross estate under subsec-
tions (c) or (d). Furthermore, these provisions might embrace several
different factual situations, both where the settlor is a trustee, and where
he is not.
SETTLOR AS TRUSTEE
The situation where the power is reserved to the settlor as settlor is
obvious, and it is also well settled now that if he retains his control by
acting as trustee the tax result will be the same.'8 This is expectable,
since it is elementary that when faced with fiscal necessity, the federal
courts today are impatient of the niceties of property law. Such prag-
matism is not, however, always so clearly expressed in the opinions.
To come within § 811(d), the property must be subject to change by
the exercise of the power at the settlor's death, and inclusion has been
refused where a power of invasion was to arise upon a contingency not
then fulfilled, such as the death of the settlor's wife,' or arrival of the life
13. Comm'r v. Bridgeport City Trust Co., 124 F. .2d 48 (2d Cir. 1942), cert.
denied, 316 U. S. 672 (1942).
14. Est. of Harry Holmes v. Comm'r, 326 U. S. 480 (1946), reversing 148 F. 2d
740 (5th Cir. 1945) ; cf. Comm'r v. Newbold Est., 158 F. 2d 694 (2d Cir. 1946).
15. 165 F. 2d 142 (1st Cir. 1947), reversing Est. of Milton J. Budlong, 7 T. C. 756
(1946), 8 T. C. 284 (1947) in part, for further determination of facts and to redeter-
mine the extent of deficiency owed.
16. See note 10 supra.
17. See U. S. Treas. Reg. 80, Art. 80 (1937). See Est. of E. L. Ballard, 47
B. T. A. 784, 792 (1942) ; Jennings v. Smith, 161 F. 2d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 1947). But see
Magruder, J., dissenting in Industrial Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 165 F. 2d 142, 148 (2d
Cir. 1947).
18. Welch v. Terhune, 126 F. 2d 695 (1st Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 644
(1942). Moreover, the fact that consent of other persons, e. g., other trustees or some
of the beneficiaries, is prerequisite to the settlor's action is immaterial. U. S. Treas.
Reg. 105, § 81.20 (1942).
19. Est. of E. L. Ballard, 47 B. T. A. 784 (1942), aff'd, 138 F. 2d 512 (2d Cir.
1943) ; Est. of Mary Tetzlaff, P-H 1943 TC MEm. DEc. SERv. 43,034 (1943), aff'd,
141 F. 2d 8 (8th Cir. 1944). But cf. Omaha Nat. Bank v. O'Malley, 69 F. Supp. 354,
361-368 (D. Neb. 1946) sentble. Likewise where corpus could be invaded provided
production of income would not be reduced below a specified sum, and the yearly
income had never come up to the sum set. Est. of Maurice Markson, P-H 1944 TC
MEmX. DEc. SERv. ff 44,105 (1944).
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beneficiary at a named age.20  More difficulty is, however, experienced
when, as is typical of such "discretionary trusts," the power is to be exer-
cised for the beneficiary's "comfort, support and happiness,' 21 to main-
tain the beneficiary in an "accustomed standard of living,'; 22 or the
like,23 or in case of sickness or financial emergentcy.2 4  The contingency
test is not very helpful here because of the latitude within which the power
may be exercised, and the mere fact that the power has not yet been exer-
cised will not necessarily prevent estate taxation.2 4i The courts tend to
look for an outside standard limiting the trustee's discretion. Under the
dogma of the cases, the existence of such a standard, enforceable in equity,
will prevent inclusion of the trust in the decedent's estate.2 6 The theory
sometimes expressed is that the trustee's discretion may .not be exercised
except upon the happening of a contingency, but it can likewise- be argued
that a "power" limited in this manner is not really a power at al.2 -
That an enforceable standard exists where sickness or other emergency
(including financial) is a prerequisite to invasion, would seem to be well
established.28 ' On the other hand, when invasion is to be for the bene-
ficiary's "benefit," or his "comfort, support and happiness," estate tax
imposition may well result.29  A power exercisable to maintain the bene-
ficiary in an accustomed standard of living would appear at first glance
equally unqualified, but in two cases such a power did not result in
inclusion.
In Est. of George F. Fiske,3 0 'the trust deed provided that if the life
tenant was in need of funds above her income to live in a manner con-
sistent with her accustomed standard, the trustees could relieve her need
by paying over corpus, or by a loan from principal.3 1 "' The rest of this
20. Est. of Win. Stuart Spaulding, P-H 1,944 TC MEm. DEC. SEav. 144,141 (1944).
21. First Nat. Bank v. Welch, 24 F. Stipp. 695 (D. Mass. 1938) ; Est. of Oscar
Perrin, P-H 1944 TC MEm. DEC. Smwv. 1144,105 (1944).
22. Jennings v. Smith, 161 F. 2d 74 (2d Cir. 1947) ; Est. of George F. Fiske, P-H
1946 TC MEmr. DEC. SEav. 1146,020 (1946).
23. Est. of Albert E. Nettleton, 4 T. 'C. 987 (1945) ("interests" and "welfare");
Est. of Maurice Markson, P-H 1944 TC MEm. DEc. SERV. 1144,105 (1944) ("comfort
and happiness," a different trust than that cited to note 19 supra).
24. Est. of Milton J. Budlong, 7 T. C. 756 (1946) ; Jennings v. Smith, 161 F. 2d
74 (2d Cir. 1947).
25. Est. of Albert E. Nettleton, 4 T. C. 987, 993 (1945). However, in many cases
in which a contrary result has been reached, this fact is noted by the court. See, e. g.,
Jennings v. Smith, supra note 24, at 78; Est. of Walter E. Frew, 8 T. C. 1240, 1242
(1947) ; Est. of George F. Fiske, P-H 1946 TC MEmr. DEC. Sav. 1 46,020, pp. 46-43
(1946); Est. of Maurice Markson, P-H 1944 TC MEm. DEC. SERv. 1144,105, pp.
44-339 (1946).
26. See discussion in Jennings v. Smith, 161 F. 2d 74, 77 (2d Cir. 1947) ; and Est.
of Milton J. Budlong, 7 T. C. 756, 761-763 (1946).
27. Ibid.
28. Jennings v. Smith, rupra note 26; Est. of Milton J. Budlong, supra note 26,
Comm'r acq., 1 Cum. BuLL. 1947, (tax imposed on other grounds, supra note 15);
Est. of John A. Lucey, CCH 1947 TC MEm. DEC. SErv. 1 16,107 (1947).
29. Est. of Albert E. Nettleton, 4 T. C. 987 (1945) (beneficiary's "interest" or
"welfare"); Est. of Maurice Markson, P-H 1944 TC MEm. DEC. SERV. 1144,105
(1944) ("comfort, and happiness" of wife, see note 23 supra) ; Est. of Oscar Perrin,
P-H 1944 TC MEm. DEC. SEav. 1144,076 (1944) ("comfort, support and happiness").
Contra: First Nat. Bank v. Welch, 24 F. Supp. 695 (D. Mass. 1938). Query the effect
of Est. of Walter E. Frew, 8 T. C. 1240 (1947) upon such trust clauses in the future.
See text backed by note 39 infra. Cf. C. W. Sherman Est., 9 T. C. No. 82 (1947)
(non-acq. 1948-2-12729).
30. P-H 1946 TC MEm. DEC. SERv. 1146,020 (1946).
31. Id. at 46-43. Other possibilities for trustee action included illness, infirmity
or disability of the life tenant, or to defray expenses occasioned by education of her
children.
provision dealt at length with the conditions of the empowered loan. In
denying inclusion the short memorandum opinion rested on the unfufilled
condition principle8 2 and also referred to the existence of a fixed
standard.33
Trusts involved in Jennings v. Smith 3 4 directed the trustees to ac-
cumulate income during the life of the life tenant, unless "in their absolute
discretion" they determined it was "reasonably necessary" to use it for the
maintenance of the life tenant "in accordance with his station in life." sr
At the death of the settlor, who was one of the trustees, income had not
yet been used for this purpose, having always been accumulated. In
refusing to include the trust in the settlor's estate under § 811(d), the
court reasoned that the trustee's discretion was limited by a clearly ascer-
tainable standard and pointed out that "the contingency which would
justify the exercise of the power had not happened before the decedent's
death." 31 The other aspect of the outside standard concept was, how-
ever, argued in refusing inclusion under § 811(c), the court stating that
such a limited power was closer to a "duty" than to a "right" to designate
who was to enjoy the trust property or income.87
It is arguable that the narrowness of a power over income only, was
an important factor in the decision in the Jennings case that § 811(d)
was not applicable.38  However, in Est. of Walter E. Frew,09 the Tax
Court refused to include in the settlor's estate an inter vivos trust over
which the settlor-trustee had an invasion power to be exercised if the
income was insufficient "for the proper maintenance and support" of the
beneficiary. The opinion revolves around the establishment, by the words
of the trust, of an equitable standard of trustee conduct.
While there is some discussion in the Frew opinion of state decisions
involving equitable intervention in the administration of this type of trust,40
32. Est. of E. L. Ballard, 47 B. T. A. 784 (1942) ; and Est. of Mary Tetzlaff,
P-H 1943 TC Mm. DEc. SERv. 114,304 (1943) were cited, both standing for the con-
tingency principle; see note 19 s=pra.
33. P-H 1946 TC MEM. DEC. SERv. 1146,020, 46-43 (1946). The concentration of
the trust deed upon loans from the corpus might be argued as a factor limiting the
decision. Where the loan is to be made to the grantfor, unsecured and without interest,
it might well produce exactly the same result as an invasion power (compare Hallock
situation described in text backed by notes 62-68 infra with U. S. Treas. Reg. 111,
§ 29.22(a) -21(e) (2) (1943) which causes income of such a trust to be taxable to the
grantor). Here, however, interest was to be paid, and there is another important differ-
ence in that the loan is not to be made to the -grantor, but to his wife, the life tenant.
34. 161 F. 2d 74 (2d Cir. 1947).
35. The trustees also had the power to invade in case of sickness or emergency;
see notes 24, 28 supra.
36. 161 F. 2d at 78. It is interesting to compare this trust with that in Est. of
Milton J. Budlong, 7 T. C. 756, 763, 764 (1946), see note 15 supra, in which the in-
come above $2500 could be accumulated in one of the trusts. The Tax Court included
this trust in the settlor's estate under § 811(c) deducting the value of the $2500
"annuity." This is the part of the decision which was reversed and remanded to
redetermine the deficiency and to find out if the trustee really had the power to accumu-
late, in other words whether the income ever exceeded $2500. Industrial Trust Co. v.
Comm'r, 165 F. 2d 142 (1st Cir. 1947).
37. 161 F. 2d at 78-79.
38. The court seems to discuss the power from this point of view. See 161 F. 2d
at 78, 79. However, the trustee's discretion to invade is limited by more than the life
tenant's rights. A court of equity might well intervene at the instance of remainder-
men if a trustee invaded corpus for an amount greater than the yearly trust income
in order to preserve the life beneficiary's stan.dard of living.
39. 8 T. C. 1240 (1947). See also note 29 supra. The Commissioner has ac-
quiesced in this decision. 1947-2 Cum. BuLL. 22.
40. 8 T. C. 1240, 1243 (1947). This discussion is neither extensive nor detailed.
See Blunt v. Kelly, 131 F. 2d 632, 634 (3d Cir. 1942) for similar treatment of state law.
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it is plain that the case actually turned on previous tax holdings. Although
it may serve as a handy thumb rule for the practitioner, the outside
standard concept is not very helpful in analyzing the cases from a tax
point of view. In the first place, state decisions on the discretionary
powers of trustees defy exact analysis. One thing is clear: despite the
slight differences in wording employed in the various trusts, the courts
are exceedingly reluctant to interfere unless the trustee has been guilty of
bad faith or serious inattention to duty.41 The probability of equitable
interference is at best a rough guess dependent on many imponderables,
not the least of which is a demand by one of the beneficiaries for judicial
action. Secondly, even if such a standard does exist, it may in many
factual situations be a poor criterion of tax liability. "An accustomed
standard of living," or even "maintenance and support," are susceptible
of many definitions and widely varying treatment. The trustee is still
given considerable latitude within which he can shift the interests of the
various beneficiaries. Reference to equitable enforcement of trust pro-
visions tends to obscure the underlying issues.
It is probably safe to say that there is soxne element of estate tax
avoidance or minimization in the creation of almost any inter vivos trust
today. In determining whether or not to apply a rule of avoidance pre-
vention, the courts must make a rough value judgment on the basis of
various factors. First, of course, comes the statute itself, though this par-
ticular aspect of discretionary powers invokes no vexing questions of con-
struction.4' Secondly the actual possibilities of revenue loss involved, and
the extent to which a given device is or may be used for avoidance pur-
poses, must be balanced against the utility of the device for property
settlements. In reaching such a judgment the individual case may well
be more important than the establishment or following of general rules;
thus an atmosphere almost of ad hoc adjudication is imparted.44 Further,
the actual intent of the settlor may be extremely important,4 though the
courts on the whole shy away from difficult subjective standards.4 5  Ortho-
dox property concepts also play their role.
41. See 3 BoGERT, TRuSTS AND TRUSTEES J 560 (1946; Supp. 1948) and cases
therein cited. A more detailed analysis of state law on this trust problem has not
been attempted here for reasons explained in the text. Some of the tax cases indi-
cate that a contrary opinion is expressed in RESTATEMENT, TRusTs § 187 (1935) and 2
Scowt, TRusTs §§ 187.1-187.5 (1939). No doubt a court would be more likely to in-
terfere with the trustee when his discretion is limited, than when it is not, but the
Restatement really seems to mean only that there is little likelihood of intervention
in the latter case.
42. The wording of the statute leads rather obviously to the "contingency" de-
cisions. However, few if any of the cases discuss statutory construction. Lack of
reference to the legislative intent may indicate either that the statute has been left
behind, or that the judges are interpreting without articulate discussion what they
believe to be the legislature's purpose. Cf. Heydon's Case, 3 Co. 7a, 76 Eng. Rep. 637
(1584). In either event it is ". . . originative judicial action." Jones, Statutory
Doubts and Legislative Intention, 40 COL. L. REv. 957, 972 (1940).
43. Cases involving tax avoidance are of a peculiarly factual nature, and the
"functional approach" is particularly applicable to tax decisions. PAUL, STUDIES IN
FEDERAL TAXATION 91, 92 (1937). Nevertheless, rules applied with syllogistic pre-
cision have probably influenced results as well as dressed opinions. See, e. g., text
backed by notes 50, 62-68 infra.
44. See Paul, STuDIEs IN FEDERAL TAXATION 106, 120, 141 (1937) ; see Gregory
v. Helvering, 69 F. 2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), aff'd, 293 U. S. 465, 468-470 (1935).
See PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION 106, 120, 141 (1937); PAUL, SELEcTIVE
STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION 293-304 (2d series 1938). Under the "contemplation
of death" provisions of the estate tax, motive and intent play a less subtle role.
45. See Note, 95 U. OF PA. L. REv. 538, 548 (1947).
At the outset it is apparent that trustees' discretionary powers are
very useful devices for other reasons than tax avoidance, and that it
might be unfortunate to tax them out of existence. Moreover, many of
the powers suggested as a basis of inclusion have been rather limited in
scope. This is true of a power to allocate profits from a sale of trust
property to either income or principal,46 or a power of invasion conditioned
on sickness or emergency. Power to accumulate or pay over income like-
wise seems rather narrow. Furthermore, the possibility that the settlor
will remain liable for income taxes upon the property placed in trust may
well be a sufficient deterrent to the use of discretionary powers simply
as a device of avoidance.47 In many of the cases, the fact that the power
had never been used is some indication that the trust was not a mere
substitute for testamentary distribution.48  Some or all of these factors
may well incline the courts against estate tax imposition unless the exer-
cise of the power is nearly unlimited. Moreover, the outside standard
concept is a familiar figure in tax litigation,4 9 often having been used suc-
cessfully by the Bureau to show a possibility of reverter under the Hallock 50
doctrine. Past victories have thus proved embarrassing to the Commis-
sioner, as the doctrine which aided him in one situation became a readily
acceptable argument for the taxpayer in another.
WHEN SETTLOR IS NOT A TRUSTEE
Besides the problems already met, others arise when the settlor is
not a trustee. It has long been argued that maintenance of control by the
settlor is no more difficult when power over the trust property is vested
solely in another than when the power is shared with the settlor.r1 In either
case, consent of another person is required before the power may be exer-
cised. If family or economic ties subject this person to the settlor's control,
46. Considered too minor to produce inclusion in Est. of George F. Fiske, P-H
1946 TC MExm. DEc. SERv. 1146,020 (1946), such a power is specifically excluded as a
factor in income taxation in the "Clifford" regulations, T. D. 5567 (I), 1947-2 Cum.
BuLL. 12 at 12. See text and notes 78, 79 infra.
47. Discretionary powers in the settlor-trustee might well operate to charge him
with income tax liability. See text backed by note 78 infra. For an interesting situa-
tion where restitution was granted after an avoidance attempt by means of a family
partnership had failed, see Stone v. Stone, 319 Mich. 194, 29 N. W. 2d 271 (1947), 61
HA~v. L. Rxv. 553 (1948). The grantor had left himself without enough income-
producing property to pay income tax on the part transfetred.
48. See note 25 supra, and text, and note 44 supra.
49. See text and notes immediately infra. It also makes its appearance as a
preventer of tax liability in the "Clifford" regulations (see note 46 supra). In addi-
tion, one of the purposes of the revisions of § 811 (f) of the Revenue Code carried out
by § 403 of the Revenue Act of 1942 was to tax powers of invasion, and the like,
which were in fact powers of appointment. H. R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess., discussion under § 403 (1942). However, "fiduciary powers" were not to be
taxed. Randolph Paul, Tax Advisor to the Secretary of the Treasury in Hearings
before Committee on Ways and Means on Revente Bill of 1942, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.
91 (1942). See also U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.24 (1942).
50. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106 (1940). See text backed by notes 62-68,
infra. The ramifications of the Hallock doctrine are outside the confines of this
note. In essence the theory is that where the settlor has retained some reversionary
interest or "possibility of reverter," the trust falls within the ambit of § 811(c) as a
transfer intended to take effect at death. Under the latest regulations, it appears
that interests which have vested prior to the settlor's death, and are not affected
by this event, are excluded from his estate. T. D. 5512, 1946-1 Cum. BUL. This
latter situation could hardly arise, however, when a power of corpus invasion has
been retained.
51. 1 PAUL, FDERAL ESTATE AND Gn= TAXATION 331 (1942).
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the end result will frequently be the same, whether the settlor is a fellow
trustee or not. Congressional leaders contemplated drafting the 1936 Reve-
nue Act to include under § § 811 (c) and (d) powers given solely to other
persons, if these persons were actually in the settlor's control, 52 but such
an amendment was not expressly carried out. Nevertheless, the Commis-
sioner has several times argued that a trust was subject to change by the
settlor, when he was not the trustee, because of his actual control. Such
arguments have, so far, not met with judicial approval. 53 The fact that
the statute expressly deals with a power exercisable alone or in conjunc-
tion with another person 5 4 is susceptible to an expressio unius interpreta-
tion, reinforced by the negative inference arising from the committee report
just cited.55 Moreover, by transferring the property to another without
expressly retaining any rights or powers, the settlor has done all he can
do to sever himself from control from the point of view of trust law. The
existence of a gift tax to cover such situations thus becomes a strong
indication of legislative intent. It might be thought that by declining to
follow the Bureau's argument 56 on the facts of particular cases, the Tax
Court has left the issue open, but its decision in Est. of George H. Burr 
57
indicates that even actual proof of control might not be enough to produce
inclusion. A persuasive factual situation has, however, never reached the
Supreme Court. It is not hard to imagine the Court which handed down
such realistic opinions as those in Helvering v. Hallock 58 and Helvering
52. H. R. REP No. 2818, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10. The income tax provisions
prevent the settlor from self insulation through use of a controlled trustee. See INT.
REv. CoDE § 167 (grantor a beneficiary) ; "Clifford" regulations, T. D. 5567(I), 1947-
2 Cu . BULL. 110.
53. See, e. g., Comm'r v. Douglass' Est., 143 F. 2d 961, 963 (3d Cir. 1944) ; Est.
of Hugh M. Beugler, 2 T. C. 1052, 1058 (1943); Est. of E. L. Ballard, 47 B. T. A.
784, 791, 792 (1942).
54. Section 811(d) uses this phraseology in reference to a power to change enjoy-
ment. Section 811(c) uses it referring to a power -to designate who is to enjoy
the property or the income therefrom.
55. Also § 811(d) states it is immaterial in what capacity the power is exercisable.
See note 18 supra. This might be argued to necessitate action in some capacity cre-
ated by the trust deed.
56. As was done, for example in Est. of E. L. Ballard; 47 B. T. A. 784, 792
(1942). Cf. Est. of C. W. Sherman, 9 T. C. No. 82 (1947). For a circuit court
decision see Comm'r v. Douglass Est., 143 F. 2d 961, 963 (3d Cir.1944).
57. Estate of Geo. H. Burr, P-H 1945 TC MEm. DEc. SERV. 1145,364 (1946).
Burr, a successful stock market operator, caused a Canadian corporation to be formed,
through which he carried on his activities. Burr owned a majority of the outstanding
stock until he transferred his holdings to various members of his family to avoid
paying Canadian income tax. He owned outstanding notes of the corporation repre-
senting very large obligations. In several years he made gifts to the corporation by
cancelling some of his notes. Only thus were funds lawfully made available for
dividends. At the time of his death Burr could funnel off net earnings to himself
by demanding payments on his other notes, or making the earnings available for
dividends by cancellation. The Tax Court observed that dividend declaration was a
matter entirely in the directors' discretion, and that cancellation of the notes placed
the corporation under no obligation to pay dividends. The opinion admits, however,
that the directors "were in the nature of employees of decedent" (P-H 45-1199).
Furthermore, his very real, though extra-legal, control of the corporation was backed
by options to purchase all the authorized but unissued stock. Only a very small pro-
portion of the stock had been issued. The Tax Court held that, the value of the
shares Burr had transferred was not taxable to his estate under either § 811(c) or
§811(d).
58. 309 U. S. 106 (1940).
v'. Clifford 59 being favorably impressed by the Commissioner's contention
and giving it substance through a liberal interpretation of the word "power"
in § 811(d). 60
A Power Exercisable in Favor of the Settlor: So far the discussion has
been directed mainly toward powers exercisable in favor of persons other
than the settlor. Where the settlor is in essence a beneficiary of the
trust by reason of a power of invasion or income distribution exercisable
in his favor, the Commissioner has met with more success. An argument
that because the trustee could distribute income to the settlor, a right to
the income had been retained under § 811(c), would probably not be
persuasive 61 unless the exercise of discretion was stringently limited by
the deed of trust. However, a power to invade corpus for the settlor's
benefit may fall within the Hallock doctrine.62 If the terms of the trust
give any opportunity for equitable supervision of the trustee, the result
has been inclusion in the settlor's estate.63 The extreme case, perhaps, is
an invasion power, exercisable for the "needs of the grantor." 64 A con-
trary result was reached in Comm'r v. Irving Trust Co.65 where invasion
was left to the trustee's discretion, unlimited by any ascertainable outside
standard. In this case, though it is nowhere stated in the opinion, the
rationale would seem to be that since the settlor may not enforce invasion
by legal means, action by the trustee is too remote to produce even a
possibility of reverter. 66 Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Rothensies 67
was distinguished on its facts, though this case has been thought to stand
59. 309 U. S. 331 (1940).
60. See MAGH.L, THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL TAXES 101-102 (1943). But see 1
PAUL, ESTATE AND GIFt TAXATION 331 (1942).
61. See Herzog v. Comm'r, 116 F. 2d 591, 595 (2d Cir. 1941). Moreover, such
an argument would automatically exclude trusts created prior to 1931. See note 9
supra.
62. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106 (1940). See note 50 supra.
63. Blunt v. Kelly, 131 F. 2d 632 (3d Cir. 1942); Toeller's Est. v. Comm'r,
165 F. 2d 665 (7th Cir. 1948) ("misfortune and sickness"); Hurd v. Comm'r, 160
F. 2d 610 (1st Cir. 1947); Brewer v. Hassett, 49 F. Supp. 501 (D. Mass. 1943)
("comfort or support"); Est. of Virginia H. West, 9 T. C. 736 (1947) ; Est. of M. V.
Cochran, 9 T. C. 242 (1947) ; Est. of Lelia E. Coulter, 7 T. C. 1280 (1946) ; Est. of
Malcom D. Champlin, 6 T. C. 280 (1946) ("maintenance and comfort") ; Est. of Ida
Rosenwasser, 5 T. C. 1043 (1945) ("maintenance and comfort"); Est. of Margaret
P. Gallois, 4 T. C. 840 (1945), aff'd on another ground, 152 F. 2d 81 (9th Cir. 1945),
cert. denied, 327 U. S. 798 (1946); Est. of Thomas Neal, P-H 1943 T. C. MEM.
DEC. SERv. 43,518 (1943); cf. Comm'r v. O'Keeffe, 118 F. 2d 639 (1st Cir. 1941)
("serious illness or other grave emergency").
64. Chase Nat. Bank v. Higgins, 38 F. Supp. 858 (S. D. N. Y. 1941). Actually
the settlor had received a large part of the principal before his death. Cf. text and
notes 25, 48 supra.
65. 147 F. 2d 946 (2d Cir. 1945); accord, Est. of Louis Stewart, P. H. 1945,
T. C. MEm. DEC. SERv. 1145,015 (1945). The distinction between a power limited only
by the "needs of the settlor," and an unlimited power appea:rs to be only a matter
of words. This distinction is, however, approved in the decision on one of the
Budlong trusts [7 T. C. 756, 762 (1946)] in the argument in reference to a power
to invade in case of sickness or other emergency. The rationale was again mentioned
with approval in Est. of Walter E. Frew, 8 T. C. 1240 (1947) (see text and notes
39, 40 supra) which involved invasion "for the proper maintenance and support" of
the beneficiary. One wonders if the language of the Frew opinion could in the future
be made to include facts like those of Chase Nat. Bank v. Higgins, supra note 64, in a
case involving a settlor-trustee.
66. Logically, there should be a possibility of reverter, and the Hailock doctrine
should be satisfied, whether the trustee's discretion is limited or not.
67. 324 U. S. 108 (1945).
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for the proposition that remoteness of the reverter is immaterial. 68 The
use of even a prophylactic rule may be justified in the settlor-beneficiary
situations because of the great avoidance possibilities involved. Admittedly,
there must be some limit to extension of the Hallock doctrine, but the
Irving Trust distinction seems undesirable, since gifts subject to invasion
for the settlor seem to fall inevitably within the fundamental estate tax
provisions regarding transfers taking effect at death.
A Power Exercisable on Behalf of Someone Other Than the Settlor:
Where the settlor is not a beneficiary, elimination of the arguments for in-
clusion based on a broad construction of the word "power" in § 811 (d) and
the "right to designate who shall enjoy the property or income therefrom"
provision of § 811 (c), does not exhaust the Bureau's ammunition. There
remains the possibility that the settlor .has retained under § 811(c) the
equivalent of a life estate in the "enjoyment of, or right to the income
from, the property." 69 For instance in Helvering v. Mercantile Com-
merce Bank,70 the Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, ordered an inter vivos
trust included in the settlor's estate, the income of which was payable to
the settlor's wife for life to be used for family expenses and her own
maintenance. The rationale was that since the trust income relieved the
settlor of support obligations, he had retained at least the enjoyment of
the income. This is one of many cases in which the beneficiaries were
dependents of the settlor or persons to whom he owed a legal obligation
in which the Commissioner has argued for inclusion on the basis of the
income tax concepts of substantial ownership, constructive receipt, or
vicarious enjoyment, advanced in such cases as Douglas v. Willcuts,71
and Helvering v. Clifford.72  In the absence of extrinsic constructional
aids 78 this theory puts a heavy burden on the words "enjoyment of, or
right to the income" as bearers of legislative meaning. On the other hand,
the theory readily falls in with the avowed Congressional motive behind
the Joint Resolutions, 74 namely, to prevent avoidance by retention of bene-
68. See 1 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND G=Fr TAXATION § 7.12 n. 8g (Supp. 1946).
The extreme factual remoteness of the reverter possibility in some of the cases in-
volving "reverters by operation of law" might well make the Irving Trust position
untenable. See, e. g., Comm'r v. Bank of California, 155 F. 2d 1 (9th Cir. 1946),
cert. denied, 329 U. S. 725 (1946), in which the decedent would have had to outlive
several children, grandchildren, and great grandchildren to regain the trust property,
and yet this inter vivos trust was included under the Hallock rationale. The Tax
Court view has often been contrary on this particular issue, though the circuit courts
have been almost uniform. The conflict will probably be ended by the Supreme
Court sometime this term. Having granted certiorari in two cases last year [Comm'r
v. Est. of F. L. Church, 161 F. 2d 11 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. granted, 331 U. S. 803
(1947) ; Comm'r v. Est. of S. M. Spiegel, 159 F. 2d 257 (7th Cir. 1947), cert. granted,
331 U. S. 798 (1947)], the Court ordered the cases redocketed June 21, 1948 and gave
instructions to counsel as to questions to be argued, 17 U. S. L. WEEK- 3013 (U. S.
July 6, 1948).
69. INT. R v. CoDE § 811 (c).
70. 111 F. 2d 224 (8th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U. S. 654 (1940).
71. 296 U. S. 1 (1935) (trust income used to discharge support obligations).
72. 309 U. S. 331 (1940) (income from short term trust, the life beneficiary of
which was settlor's wife, and over which settlor as trustee retained wide control,
held to be part of his gross income).
73. Understandably, the framers of the revisions to § 811(c) did not in 1932
foresee these later developments in income tax law.
74. For a discussion of legislative motive or purpose see note 42 supra. The
issue between this newer and expanded view of statutory construction, and older
concepts of legislative intent, is clearly posed by the majority opinion and dissent in
the Clifford case.
fits for life. Legislative oversight in not expressly treating such trust
arrangements as "the essence of selfishness," 75 has been remedied by
appropriate Treasury Regulations which ambitiously include in the settlor's
estate all trusts the income of which is to be applied for his "pecuniary
benefit." 76 A liberal interpretation of the word "benefit" could con-
ceivably include almost any kind of family trust, and indeed might not
stop there."7 Since the Clifford doctrine definitely applies to most situa-
tions where the trustee is susceptible to the settlor's control,78 regardless
of whether the beneficiary is actually a dependent or not, introducing this
concept into estate taxation would be a great victory for the Bureau. On
the other hand, the "Clifford" regulations incorporate the outside standard
concept as preventing income tax liability,79 and in this respect at least
the Commissioner's gain might be limited.
While control by the settlor, either in his own right or through the
trustee's discretionary power, is one of the important factors bringing the
Clifford doctrine into play,80 the Bureau has more commonly worked from
the obligation rationale of Douglas v. Willcuts 81 and the concept of family
solidarity, and in so doing has also attempted to merge income tax doc-
trines with the estate tax in many cases not involving discretionary
powers.8 2 None of these efforts has so far met with much success, Helver-
ing v. Mercantile Commerce Bank 83 being the Commissioner's only real
victory. This case has, however, been consistently distinguished, often on
very fine grounds.8 4 The Third Circuit in Commissioner v. Douglass
75. See Frank, J., in Comm'r v. Buck, 120 F. 2d 775, 777-778 (2d Cir. 1941).
Judge Frank refers to Mr. Justice Darling as saying in SciNwrTmn JuRis ". . . that
to make a gift is the essence of selfishness and the most effective way to assert domin-
ion over property . .. " -
76. U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, §81.18 (1942).
77. See, e. g., Comm'r v. Lamont, 127 F. 2d 875 (2d Cir. 1942) (settlor subject to
income tax on trusts for distant relatives and charities. Settlor had power to substi-
tute securities; the trustee was a friend and legal adviser; and the trust was for a
short term). Note the settlor's intent as an influencing factor, id. at 876.
78. "Clifford regulations." T. D.'5488(d) 1946-1 Cum. BULL. 19, amended by
T. D. 5567(1) 1947-2 Cum. BULL. 11. But see Eisenstein, The Revised Clifford Regiu-
lations, NEW YORK UNIVERSIT SixTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION
123 (1948).
79. T. D. 5567(I) 1947-2 Cum. BULL. 11.
80. See DeWind, Trends Toward Clarity in the Clifford Case Problem, NEw
YORK UNivxRsirY FOURTH ANNUAL INsTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATioN 844 (1946);
T. D. 5488(d), supra note 78.
81. 296 U. S. 1 (1935).
82. E. g., Helvering v. Mercantile Commerce Bank, 111 F. 2d 224 (8th Cir. 1940).
Although the beneficiaries of both the Clifford and the Willcuts trusts were dependents
of the settlor, the cases rested on differing factual situations, and their "doctrines"
developed in slightly different directions. The cases stemming from the Willcuts case
emphasize the settlor's support obligation, whereas one of the greatest avenues of
expansion of the Clifford doctrine has developed on the settlor's control. Nonetheless,
these two approaches are so intertwined in the constructive receipt concept as to be
almost inextricable. Often it is hard to tell just what the basis of the Commissioner's
argument is, as in Comm'r v. P. S. Douglass' Est., 143 F. 2d 961 (3d Cir. 1944), where
the Bureau cites the Willcuts case and later argues control also. See text and notes
86-93 infra. Also note the presence of the Clifford case in the Commissioner's argu-
ment in some of the control cases cited note 53 supra.
83. See note 82 supra.
84. Comm'r v. P.. S. Douglass' Est., 143 F. 2d 961, 963 (3d Cir. 1944) (income
need not be used for dependent except in the trustee's discretion) ; Wishard v. U. S.,
143 F. 2d 704 (7th Cir. 1944) (annuity provisions did not limit beneficiary's use of
income to support) ; Est. of Clayton William Sherman, 9 T. C. No. 82 (1947), non-
acq. T. D. 12729 1948-2 Cum. BuLL. (wife not obligated to use trust income for sup-
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Est.,85 has refused inclusion of a trust for the settlor's minor child, under
which the independent trustees had power to accumulate income, or, if
they so deemed advisable, to pay it out for maintenance, education and
support.86  The court's reasoning is worth investigation. The Commis-
sioner first argued that the trust fell within the language of Regulations
80, Art. 18 (1937). s17- This was answered by pointing out that the trustees
were under no duty to pay over income except as they deemed advisable. 88
Apparently the Bureau neglected any argument of the outside standard
concept. The Commissioner's main contention, however, was more gen-
eral and based on the doctrine of constructive receipt, though without
reference to Helvering v. Clifford.8 9 The argument fell when Helvering
v. Mercantile Commerce Bank was distinguished.90 The'court went on
to characterize this doctrine as a fiction, useful in 'income tax decisions,
but to be confined thereto.91 Here the court would seem to be on firmer
ground,92 but in view of the fact that the Douglass trust might well be out-
side the ambit of the Clifford doctrine,9 3 the court's observations should,
perhaps, be limited to the factual situation involved. Admittedly, trans-
position of income tax case law into the estate tax as a method of construc-
tion, reaches into rather rarified atmosphere. Furthermore, it runs afoul
of certain judicial antipathy toward including in a decedent's estate, prop-
erty which he transferred during his lifetime in the most legally complete
manner possible. Nevertheless, the Clifford doctrine could still be a
port only); Est. of Charles E. Babcock, P-H 1946 TC MEm. DEC. SmRv. 46,002
(1946) (trustees had unlimited discretionary power to invade or accumulate. Mercatt-
tile-Commerce Bank case distinguished and Douglass case followed because wife in
disclaimer clause termed the trust as one for her maintenance, support, and well be-
ing); Est. of George H. Burr, P-H 1945 T. C. MEm. DEC. SERV. 145,364 (1945)
(wife's power as a trustee to invade for "her proper care and support" held not within
the Mercantile Commerce Bank rule). The rationale of the Mercantile Commerce
Bank case was approved in Helfrich's Est. v. Comm'r, 143 F. 2d 43 (7th Cir. 1944)
though the case turned on another point. The battle still goes on, and interesting
counterpoint to the discussion in note 29 supra is provided by the Bureau's unsuccess-
ful argument in C. W. Sherman Est., 9 T. C. No. 82 (1947) (non-acq. 1948-2-12729)
that trustees' power to invade for the wife's support rendered the trust one for support.
85. 143 F. 2d 961 (3d Cir. 1944).
86. Id. at 962.
87. "The use, possession, right to the income, or other enjoyment of the property,
will be considered as being reserved to the decedent to the extent that during any such
period it is to be applied toward a legal obligation of the decedent or otherwise for his
pecuniary benefit." This phraseology has remained unchanged by U. S. Treas. Reg.
105, §81.18 (1942).
88. The Commissioner's argument was characterized as an attempt to make "is to
be applied" read as "may be applied," 143 F. 2d at 962.
89. The Bureau cited Douglass v. Willcuts, 296 U. S. 1 (1935) and Helvering
v. Stuart, 317 U. S. 154 (1942) (both "legal obligation" cases), and Helvering v.
Mercantile Commerce Bank, 171 F. 2d 224 (8th Cir. 1940).
90. See note 84 supra. The "realistic" view of the trustee's powers (see text
backed by notes 57-60 supra) was also denied. 143 F. 2d at 963.
91. Ibid.
92. Other attempts to integrate the two statutes have failed. See Higgins v.
Comm'r, 129 F. 2d 237, 240-243 (1st Cir. 1942). The income tax provisions, such as
§ 167, are admittedly far broader.
93. On the basis of decided cases, the trustees' discretion was limited by an ascer-
tainable outside standard (see text backed by note 79 supra). Moreover, the weak-
ness of the Commissioner's "realistic" argument (143 F. 2d at 963) might indicate
that these trustees were not within the control of the settlor as explained in the "Clif-
ford regulations." T. D. 5567(1) 1947-2 Cum. BuLL. 11.
danger to the estate planner. The Supreme Court has not spoken, and
the Bureau's argument might carry the day in a properly presented factual
situation involving real control by the settlor over the trustee.
9 4
EVALUATION IN THE LIGHT OF PROPOSED REVISION OF ESTATE AND
GIFT TAXES
The cases which have been discussed do not present a completely
symmetrical picture, but conclusions in respect to discretionary trusts are
not too difficult to draw. In creating an inter vivos trust it is inadvisable
for even an independent trustee to be empowered to invade for, or pay
income to the grantor unless other considerations dictate assumption of
the taxation risk involved. It is in the field of reversionary interests that
the greatest Treasury pressure and Treasury success have been experienced.
The taxpayer may feel fairly safe in retaining a power in himself as
trustee, exercisable for others, provided he ties its use down to something
more specific than the beneficiary's "benefit." 115 To put the matter in
more general terms, the future settlor should feel safe in entrusting dis-
cretionary powers to an independent trustee, but he should beware of
attempts to continue his own control over the property.
Only a small segment of the estate tax has been discussed, and the
more difficult problems in taxation of inter vivos transfers have barely
been touched. The intricacy of this branch of estate taxation is common
knowledge among lawyers; and the Treasury has undertaken to suggest
overall reform of the gift and estate taxes, designed to remove much of
the complexity and uncertainty from a situation unsatisfactory to govern-
ment and taxpayer alike. 96 Briefly, the plan envisages: one transfer tax
to replace both estate and gift taxes, and one set of rates; all transfers will
be taxed at the time they are effective; transfers in any given year will
be added to previous transfers to find the overall base; credit on the new
tax will be given for taxes paid in the past; property passing at death will
be the last transfer; in general the income tax will be correlated with this
transfer tax. It may readily be seen that most of the motive force behind
both estate tax avoidance,97 and the Bureau's efforts to bring every inter
94. Whether such presentation has been made by Comm'r v. Church's Est., 161
F. 2d 11 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. granted, 331 U. S. 803 (1947) ; and Comm'r v. Spiegel's
Est., 159 F. 2d 257 (7th Cir. 1947), cert. granted, 331 U. S. 798 (1947), is perhaps
questionable. The Court has however ordered the issue of the effect of the Clifford
case on the estate tax to be argued. See CCH FFD. ESTATE & GiFT TAx SERv. 9800
(Report 58, 1948). See also notes 9, 68 supra.
95. It is important to note, however, that one danger may remain, namely, that
the property may be included in the life tenant's estate because a power of appointment
has inadvertently been given to him. One of the purposes of § 403, Internal Revenue
Act of 1942, was to tax a beneficiary's power of invasion as a power of appointment.
It would follow then that if the beneficiary is a trustee, discretionary powers might
cause the corpus of the trust to be included in his (or more likely her) estate. See
note 18 supra, and U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.24 (1942). It is certainly possible that
a too definite standard limiting a trustee's powers of invasion on behalf of the life
tenant could produce the same result where the beneficiary is not a trustee,
96. Such a plan is proposed in FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES, A PROPOSAL FOR
INTEGRATION AND CORRELATION WITH THE INCOME TAX (Government Printing Office,
1947). The proposals are a result of a joint study by the Office of the Tax Legis-
lative Counsel and an advisory committee of tax experts from civil life. This publica-
tion will hereafter be cited as PROPOSAl..
97. Several reasons of estate transfer minimization will remain. Among them
are: reducing the amount passing at death so that the amount of tax which will be
paid at that time, and which must be included in the tax base before payment will be
reduced; the possibility of setting up an accumulating trust, thus removing future ac-
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vivos transfer within the estate tax, will be removed. Payment of income
tax depends on whether a "complete" transfer has been made,98 and so
the pressure behind inter vivos transfers with control retained will by no
means be ended. However, the proposed rules as to "completeness" are
specific enough to remove most present uncertainties, whatever the course
of future litigation might be. As they touch on discretionary powers, the
rules are generally as follows: (1) a disposition with the power, con-
tingent or otherwise, to change the beneficial enjoyment is incomplete even
when the power is vested solely in someone other than the transferor, 99
but, if the power is only one to accumulate or apply income for a current
income beneficiary, or to invade such beneficiary's share of the corpus, the
transfer is complete; 10 (2) if the income may be distributed to the settlor
himself, the transfer is incomplete; 101 (3) if some possibility of reverter
(probably including a power of corpus invasion) is retained, the transfer
is incomplete, except as to interests which can take independent of the
grantor's death. 02 If the Revenue Code is thus amended, the suggestions
previously made will have to be changed in two respects: unlimited dis-
cretionary powers of certain types may freely be used; 103 and the "inde-
pendence" of the trustee will be immaterial.
S. W. M.
Standards Governing Relief Under Section 4 of the Sherman Act
Congress has been liberal in providing sanctions against violations of
the Sherman Antitrust Act.' That businessmen, if they depart from the
standards of legality determined under the act, are subject to a fine or
imprisonment 2 or to suit by their injured competitors for triple damages,3
is well known. Less familiar is the provision for the seizure of goods
transported in interstate or foreign commerce contrary to the law.4 Per-
haps the most familiar remedy of all, and certainly the most interesting,
is that giving the federal district courts jurisdiction in equity to prevent
cumulations from the transferor's tax base [see problem posed by Est. of James E. Friz-
zell, 9 T. C. No. 130 (1947) and excellent comment thereon, 96 U. OF PA. L. REv.
706 (1948)]. PROPOSAL 21 treats this avoidance device as unimportant. On the other
hand the taxpayer must take care to leave enough assets in his estate to take care of
the final transfer tax.
98. In some situations, the donor will continue to pay income tax despite making
a complete transfer for transfer tax purposes. This may occur when income of the
transferred property is payable to a dependent of the transferor, PROPOSAL 34; or in
certain situations where the settlor may borrow from the trusts, PROPOSAL 35.
99. PROPOSAL 18, 20.
100. Id. at 19. Such a power is spoken of as limited in scope. This attitude
may account for the Commissioner's acquiescence in the Frew case, see note 39
up ra.
101. PROPOSAL 25, 33-34.
102. Id. at 23, but as to income tax see pp. 29 et seq.
103. Thus avoiding the difficulty alluded to in note 95 supra.
1. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 1 (1940). For an evaluation of the sanc-
tions see HAMILTON AND TILL, ANTITRUST INf ACTION 75-85 (TNEC Monograph 16.
1940).
2. Id. §§ 1-3.
3. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 15 (1940).
4. 26 STAT. 210 (1890), 15 U. S. C. §6 (1940). This provision has been used
only three times. See HAMILTON AND TIL., op. cit. supra note 1, at 81.
and restrain violations of the act at the suit of the Attorney General.5 The
early suits brought under § 4, as well as those for the application of the
other remedial measures, raised principally problems of substantive inter-
pretation, but, while the nature of the evil attacked by the law makes it
inevitable that substantive problems will remain, recent cases have been
controversies mainly over the provisions to be embodied in the court's
decree.6 Assuming a violation of the act has been found, the question
has become, What may and what will the court do to remedy the situa-
tion? Since the answer to this question is important, both to govern-
mental officials charged with enforcement of the act and to businessmen
and their lawyers faced with possible antitrust litigation, this note will
attempt to determine the patterns that the courts have traced in framing
anitrust decrees, the limitations under which they operate, and the solu-
tions to some of the recurring problems that they have given.
GENERAL
The problem of the scope of equitable relief almost always assumes
greater proportions in antitrust cases than in the ordinary bill for an in-
junction or mandatory decree. In the ordinary case the court is asked to
put an end to, or prevent, some continuing or threatened activity on the
part of the defendant which allegedly violates, or will violate, the plaintiff's
rights and for which no adequate remedy exists at law.7 To decide the
case, the court will have to determine what, if any, the rights of the plaintiff
are in the circumstances alleged; whether and how they are about to be,
,or actually are being, violated by the defendant; and whether there is a
lack of an adequate remedy at law. The problem, in short, is whether an
injunction shall issue, not, in the ordinary case what shall be ordered. In
antitrust cases, however, the court, after an analysis parallel to that just
outlined, still faces the difficult problem of determining precisely what, if
relief is to be granted, shall be enjoined or required by its decree. There
are, it is true, some cases that present little difficulty: e. g., a certain con-
tract entered into by the defendant is held to be in restraint of trade; it is
a simple matter for the court to declare that contract null and void and
enjoin its execution.8 But where the defendant has, say, an almost com-
plete monopoly of a given commodity, or has integrated and controls an
entire industry,9 it is an extremely difficult and complicated task for the
court to determine what must be done to restore the controls of competitive
forces.
The chief cause of this difficulty in determining the scope of anti-
trust decrees is obvious. Economic processes and the fluid phenomena of
the business world do not lend themselves to exact measurement. Eco-
S. "The several circuit courts [now district courts] of the United States are
hereby invested with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of this act; and it
shall be the duty of the several district attorneys of the United States, in their re-
spective districts, under the direction of the Attorney General, to institute proceedings
in equity to prevent and restrain such violations. Such proceedings may be by way
of petition setting forth the case and praying that such violation shall be enjoined or
otherwise prohibited. . . ." 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 4 (1940).
6. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U. S. 131 (1948) ; International
Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U. S. 392 (1947) ; United States v. National Lead Co.,
332 U. S. 319 (1947) ; Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U. S. 386 (1945).
7. Section 4 of the Sherman Act, providing as it does for relief in equity, elimi-
nates the problem of adequacy of the remedy at law. See Brown v. Hecht Co., 49 F.
Supp. 528, 532 (D. D. C. 1943).
8. See, e. g., Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 211 (1899).
9. See United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106 (1911); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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nomic developments depend to a large extent, for example, on such psy-
chological factors as the desires of the buying public and the judgments
and predictions of independent entrepreneurs or almost equally independent
corporate managers. A court, framing a decree after a violation of the
act has been found, thus cannot know accurately what the effects of the
requirements of that decree will be; it will unavoidably deal in matters of
opinion and prediction; 10 there will be no one, or no sure, solution. The
court must therefore of necessity exercise a wide discretion 11 and might
even be expected at times to proceed by a trial-and-error method.
Although the greater scope for the play of individual human differ-
ences allowed by the discretionary nature of the process of framing anti-
trust decrees has resulted in judicial disagreements as to specific pro-
visions,12 the courts have agreed on at least a verbalization of what shall
be the broad principles that guide them. Many cases have recited that
the government is entitled to "effective" or "adequate" relief.' 3 "In short,
the court may make any order necessary to bring about the dissolution or
suppression of an illegal combination. . . .", '4 Where what is necessary
is doubtful, the doubt will be resolved in favor of the government and
against the conspiracy.' 5 To this somewhat vague standard, a standard
that would appear to be not much more than a declaration of judicial
sympathy with the policy of the act,16 the courts have added a limitation
equally vague: they will seek, they say, as far as possible, to avoid undue
hardship to the public,17 to particular individuals who, although innocent
of unlawful activity, might be affected by the decree,' 8 and even, it would
seem, to the defendants themselves.' 9
Before an attempt is made to analyze the application of these broad
precepts in more or less specific situations, it should be noted that the
problem of antitrust decrees has more than a vague remedial standard to
complicate it; the criterion for determining what constitutes a violation
of the act is itself vague,20 and this substantive vagueness further com-
plicates the decree problem. It would be outside the scope of this note to
10. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in part in United States v. Paramount
Pictures, 334 U. S. 131, 180-181 (1948).
11. See United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U. S. 173, 185 (1944).
12. See, e. g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U. S. 392 (1947);
Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U. S. 386 (1945); cf. FTC v. Royal
Milling Co., 288 U. S. 212 (1933) ; FTC v. Goodgrape Co., 45 F. 2d 70, 72 (6th Cir.
1930) ; FTC v. Cassoff, 38 F. 2d 790, 791 (2d Cir. 1930).
13. See Local 167 v. United States, 291 U. S. 293, 299 (1934) ; United States v.
Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U. S. 290, 308 (1897) ; cf. Warner & Co. v. Lilly
& Co., 265 U. S. 526, 532 (1924).
14. See Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 346 (1904).
15. Local 167 v. United States, 291 U. S. 293 (1934).
16. For an indication that the attitude of the trial court in this respect is signifi-
cant in evaluating the decree, see Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in part in United
States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U. S. 131, 179-180 (1948). The fact that it is the
public interest in free competition that is being protected may cause equity to go farther
than where the public interest is not involved to grant relief. See Mercoid Corp. v.
Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U. S. 661, 670 (1944) ; Virginian Ry. v. System
Federation No. 40, 300 U. S. 515, 552 (1937).
17. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 78, 81 (1911); United
States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106, 185 (1911).
18. See United States v. Southern Pacific Co., 259 U. S. 214, 241 (1922) ; United
States v. American Tobacco Co., supra note 17, at 185.
19. See Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U. S. 386 (1945) passim.
20. This vagueness has often been recognized. See, e. g., Katz, The Consent De-
cree in Antitrust Administration, 53 HARV. L. REv. 415, 427 et seq. (1940) ; HANDLER,
A STUDY OF THE CONSTRUCTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAws
96-97 (TNEC Monograph 38, 1941).
discuss the substantive provisions of the Sherman Act and the cases decided
under it, but it is obvious that the court's definition of the violation in a
particular case and the terms of the decree will be intimately interrelated.
Before it can be determined what constitutes "adequate" or "effective"
relief, the question must be answered, Relief from what? i. e., exactly what
activities of the defendants, or what circumstances for which they are
responsible, amount to a violation of the act? This problem has received
perhaps its clearest recognition in United States v. Corn Products Co.
2 1
Judge Learned Hand there introduced his discussion of the necessity for
going beyond a mere negative injunction and ordering a dissolution of
the corporate defendant by carefully distinguishing the case in which the
exercise of monopoly power is the violation from one in which the existence
of such power is what is found unlawful. He remarked that in the latter
case there was no question but that dissolution would be required; if the
former were the case, "then the question arises What is practically neces-
sary to prevent the repetition of those unfair means ?" 22 In cases under
a statute like the Sherman Act, where a violation in many instances can
be no more accurately defined than as activity that the court deems con-
trary to a public policy in favor of maintaining a freely competitive eco-
nomic system, it will be difficult to determine the practical outcome of
prospective litigation until it is known from the trial court's conclusions
of law what part of the activity alleged in the government's complaint has
actually been found violative of the act. Lawyers on both sides, before
they can predict how the court will exercise its discretion in framing the
decree, must make an equally difficult prediction as to what the decree
will seek to remedy.
For purposes of this note, it will be convenient to make use of this
distinction made by Judge Hand: An exhaustive catalogue of specific pro-
visions which courts have used in antitrust decrees will not be made; the
attempt will be, rather, to detail the patterns that the courts have followed
in outlining the scope of such decrees. A mere order to refrain from the
particular activity held to be unlawful, while not necessarily representing
the ideal sought by the courts, might, for purposes of analysis, be considered
"normal" 23 and the discussion cast in terms of the extent to which, and
the reasons why, as in Judge Hand's first case, a court will go beyond
such a "normal" remedy.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
In the controversies that have arisen over the terms of antitrust de-
crees, one of the shields behind which defendants have persistently sought
protection has been the Constitution. The preliminary problem of the
extent of the court's power, as distinguished from that of the proper
exercise of its discretion, will therefore first be considered. When the
exact nature of a Constitutional objection to a decree is analyzed, it be-
comes obvious why, in most instances, such objections have been unavail-
ing. The Constitutionally delegated power under which Congress passed
the Sherman Act and the courts, in issuing their decrees, implement it,
is the federal power over interstate commerce.24 In seeking to set up a
21. 234 Fed. 964 (S. D. N. Y. 1916).
22. Id. at 1015.
23. Where something other than activity is the violation, e. g., judge Hand's case
of the existence of monopoly power, even a normal decree would go beyond a mere
negative order.
24. See Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 331 (1904) ; In
re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 577-582 (1895).
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Constitutional objection to the requirements of a decree, the defendants
do not assert, as they did for example in United States v. E. C. Knight
Co.,25 that the unlawful activity of which they are accused did not occur
in interstate commerce and thus, no federal power over their activity
existing, that no decree at all is permissible; they rather, in effect, admit
a violation of the statute, which is concededly valid under the commerce
clause, but assert that some other Constitutional provision is there to
thwart the granting of relief from their violation .2  They thus ask the
court to resolve an alleged conflict between different measures of federal
power and, more specifically, to determine that the plenary power over
interstate commerce is not plenary after all, but is limited by some other
Constitutional provision. The problem thus posed is not whether power
exists, but whether admittedly full power has been properly exercised,
i. e., whether the standards of reasonableness and fairness embodied in
the due process clause have been met. In most cases the answer has been
in the affirmative.
A conflict with state power under the Tenth Amendment will not bar
relief; 27 nor will the principle of freedom of contract embodied in the
Fifth Amendment restrict the scope of the court's decree.28 In the Asso-
cited Press case 29 an attempt was made to inject into the problem of the
extent of the court's power the issue of freedom of the press as guaranteed
by the First Amendment. The contention under that Amendment would
seem to be the broad one that the government is powerless to interfere in
any way with organizations engaged in the dissemination of information.
Such a claim ignores the distinction between restrictions on business
methods and restrictions on the substance of information sought to be
published . 0 It would seem to be the latter only that the First Amendment
prevents and accordingly, in the A. P. case, no restriction of the latter
type appearing, the defendant's objections were brushed aside.
3'
Some uncertainty surrounds the question of the extent to which the
Fifth Amendment will prevent the infliction of economic losses on the
defendant if that is necessary to the achievement of effective relief. The
provision concerning a taking for public use without just compensation
has been said to be irrelevant.3 2  Moreover, there is ample precedent for
the proposition that it is not a deprivation of property without due process
of law to deny the defendant some of the usual incidents of ownership, or
to promulgate a decree that will result in the diminution of the exchange
value of any of his "property." 33 Where all of the incidents of the de-
25. 156 U. S. 1 (1895).
26. See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 211, 226-235
(1899).
27. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 344 (1904).
28. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 211, 226 (1899);
United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U. S. 505, 571 (1898).
29. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S. 1 (1945).
30. See Hale, Trust Dissolution: "Atomizing" Business Units of Monopolistic
Size, 40 COL. L. REv. 615, 628 (1940) for the suggestion that an attempted judicial de-
struction of a brand would raise a First Amendment problem.
31. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S. 1, 19-20 (1945).
32. See United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U. S. 505, 571 (1898).
33. United States v. Northern Securities Co., 1 SHALE, DECREES AND JUDGMENTS
IN FEDERAL ANTII-TRUST CASES [hereafter cited as 1 D. & J.] 57 (C. C. D. Minn.
1903). See United States v. Corn Products Co., 234 Fed. 964, 1017-1018 (S. D. N. Y.
1916) ; United States v. Iake Shore & M. S. Ry., 281 Fed. 1007, 1012 and n. 2,
approved by Taft, C. J., in Continental Insurance Co. v. United States, 259 U. S. 156,
172 (1922) ; cf. In re Consolidated Electric & Gas Co., 55 F. Supp. 211 (D. Del. 1944).
fendant's ownership of a physical thing or valuable right are denied, the
case becomes highly problematical.8 4 Most recently this issue has been
litigated with respect to the patent right35 and, while no difficulty has
been found in taking away some of the defendant's rights with respect
thereto,8 6 attempts to persuade the court in effect to revoke completely a
patent or patents that have been used in violation of the act have, in con-
tested cases, failed.37 In the Hartford-Empire case the r~ason given for
denying the government this form of relief was that it amounted to a
"confiscation" of the defendant's property.38 Despite the fact that the
term "confiscation" is merely a conclusion and that, as the solution to a
due-process problem, it would seem to embody a judgment merely that
compulsory royalty-free licensing was not reasonably necessary in the
circumstances of that case, that decision has been taken to be a ruling
that the federal courts possess no power in any case to decree such relief.
9
There is, however, an indication that the Supreme Court does not interpret
the Hartford-Empire case as a ruling on the abstract question of the
existence of power and that, if such a question can be properly posed, it is
still an open one.40
EXTENSIONS OF THE SCOPE OF THE DECREE
In framing decrees in Sherman Act cases, the courts have, within the
limits of federal power over interstate commerce, and generally following
the broad principles already outlined, gradually developed doctrines con-
cerning the scope of the relief to be granted which often result in decrees
that go considerably beyond a "normal" decree as defined above.
Similar Activity: In United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n,
4
1
the defendants had formed an association for the purpose of fixing rail
freight rates, activity which the Department of Justice alleged violated
the act. An attempt was made to defeat the jurisdiction of the court by
dissolving the association before legal proceedings could be instituted, but
the Supreme Court rendered this defense unavailing, sustaining jurisdic-
tion on the ground that once a violation of the act was shown to exist, it
was proper to enjoin not only that particular violation, but similar activity,
or, more specifically, any association formed for a similar purpose.4 That
such an extension of the scope of the decree is permissible is now well
34. See Penna. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 413 (1922).
35. See United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U. S. 319, 335 (1947) ; Hartford-
Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U. S. 386, 414 (1945) ; United States v. Vehicular
Parking Ltd., 56 F. Supp. 297, 298 (D. Del. 1944).
36. United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U. S. 319, 336 (1947) (compulsory
licensing of patents at reasonable royalties) ; Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States,
323 U. S. 386, 419 (1945) (compulsory leasing or licensing at standard royalties).
37. In consent decrees, provisions have been employed which have the effect of
cancelling patents. Defendants have been enjoined from prosecuting infringement
suits based on specifically designated patents. United States v. Western Precipitation
Corp., CCH TRADE REG. SERV. (9th ed.) [ 57,458 (S. D. Cal. 1946). Patents have
been ordered dedicated to the public. United States v. Auditorium Conditioning Corp.,
CCH TRADE REG. SERV. (9th ed.) 57,428 (S. D. N. Y. 1945). Compulsory royalty-
free licensing has been decreed. United States v. General Electric Co., CCH TRADE
REG. SERv. (9th ed.) 57,448 (D. N. J. 1946).
38. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U. S. 386, 414 (1945).
39. United States v. Vehicular Parking Ltd., 61 F. Supp. 657 (D. Del. 1945).
40. See United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U. S. 319, 338 (1947).
41. 166 U. S. 290 (1897).
42. Id. at 308.
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established.43 Since injunctions under the Sherman Act have thus far
uniformly involved only the use of the general formula, and since as yet
no citation for contempt 4 has raised the issue of whether the acts alleged
to constitute the contempt are in fact similar to those that constituted the
original violation, the operation of comparable doctrine under the National
Labor Relations Act will serve as illustration. In NLRB v. Express
Publishing Co.45 the defendant had been held to have refused to bargain
in good faith with an authorized representative union in violation of the
act. In addition to ordering the company so to bargain, the Board ordered
it to "cease and desist" from "interfering with, restraining, or coercing its
employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization" and other
rights guaranteed by § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act.46 In the
contempt action, the court recognized that the Board, like a court of equity
in a bill for an injunction, could restrain acts of the same type or class as
those found to have been unlawfully committed, but it held the additional
acts which the Board restrained were not closely enough related to the
unlawful ones committed.47 In another case,48 the defendant had been
restrained from interfering with the "administration of the Employees
Group of [defendant.] or any other labor organization of its employees"
and ordered to disestablish the Employees Group. In the contempt cita-
tion the majority of the court found that the original order had been
violated by interference with the attempts of a C I O-affiliated union to
organize the defendant's employees. One judge dissented on the ground
that the original order should be interpreted to mean only any other
organization having some relation to the one ordered disestablished.
Thus a court can either enjoin specific activity which it deems similar
to that found unlawful, or make use of a general formula of the any-like-
activity type and, in a subsequent contempt action, give specific content
to the formula. This procedure involves the exercise of some discretion
and the line between the "similar" and the "dissimilar" in any case will
obviously be difficult to establish. It would appear in fact, that under the
Sherman Act the court has greater leeway than had the Board under the
National Labor Relations Act, which restricted the order to one against
the particular unfair practice involved in the proceeding. 49
Although it is thus difficult to assess in practical terms the influence
of this doctrine on the scope of relief to be granted, the cases leave no
doubt that its application results from a purpose on the part of the courts
43. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 78 (1911) ; cf. NLRB v.
Express Publishing Co., 312 U. S. 426 (1941); Bowles v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
143 F. 2d 38, 42 (7th Cir. 1944) ; Hershey Chocolate Corp. v. FTC, 121 F. 2d 968, 971
(3d Cir. 1941). But cf. NLRB v. Swift & Co., 108 F. 2d 988 (7th Cir. 1940).
44. Enforcement of antitrust decrees by punishment for contempt has been rare.
HAMILTON AND TiLr., op. cit. supra note 1, at 77, 93. See also Bigelow v. RKO Radio
Pictures, 78 F. Supp. 250 (N. D. Ill. 1948).
45. 312 U. S. 426 (1941).
46. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S.
C. § 151 (Supp. 1939), provided that employees were to have the right "to self-organ-
ization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through rep-
resentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection."
47. NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U. S. 426, 435 (1941).
48. NLRB v. Lowenstein & Sons, Inc., 121 F. 2d 673 (2d Cir. 1941).
49. 49 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 166 (Supp. 1939). Where the order being
reviewed has been made by an expert administrative body, however, it can be argued
that it should have greater discretion than an inferior court. See Mr. Justice Doug-
las, dissenting in NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U. S. 426, 439 (1941).
to prevent evasion of their decrees. 50 Any evidence indicating the likeli-
hood of such evasion, e. g., uncooperativeness on the part of the defendantr'
or deliberateness in the violation,5 2 will result in a decree of broader scope
than where such evidence is lacking. The seriousness of the violation will
also probably have its effect.
53
Threatened Activity: Equal difficulty and lack of specificity surround
the doctrine that violations threatened by the defendant or "fairly to be
anticipated" from him may be enjoined. 4 Section 4 of the act gives the
federal courts jurisdiction not only to restrain, but to prevent violations. 5
It would seem, however, that in enjoining threatened activity the courts
actually go beyond the preventive jurisdiction envisaged by the terms of
that section, or by normal equity jurisdiction. An injunction will go not
merely against some specific violation or some specific means of accom-
plishing that violation that, the government has proved to be imminent, but
against any violations or specific means that are possible to the defendant
and which the court deems it appropriate to enjoin. This is well illus-
trated by International Salt Co. v. United States.55  The salt company was
found to have violated the act by including in its leases of patented salt-
dispensing machines, tying clauses requiring the lessees to purchase the
salt for use with the machines from International Salt Co. The court
conceded that no threat was shown that the defendant, forbidden by the
proposed decree to use the illegal clauses, would seek to accomplish its
ends by discriminating against lessees who bought salt elsewhere; 5 never-
theless the defendant was required to lease machines to all applicants on
non-discriminatory terms, a requirement that undoubtedly deprived it of
a legal right. Thus no precise standard is involved in the doctrine of the
propriety of enjoining threatened activity, but it is used as a cloak behind
which the discretion of the court is exercised to achieve what is deemed
practically necessary for effective enforcement of the act.
Nebulous Injunctions: Still another type injunction has appeared in
antitrust cases that involves to some extent an extension of the scope of
the remedy, the nebulous injunction. Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure requires that "... every restraining order . . . shall be
specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail . . . the act or acts
sought to be restrained. . . ." This requirement is obviously for the
purpose of informing the defendant precisely what he is not to do and
thus to prevent him from being unwittingly guilty of contempt. The rule
also gives the enforcement agency, here the Antitrust Division, the advan-
tage of an easy trial should punishment by contempt proceedings become
necessary; it is easier to prove a violation of a decree where the proscribed
activity is explicitly defined than of one that is so loosely-phrased as to
amount to a direction not to violate the act.58 Nevertheless, from the
point of view of the government there is in such a loosely-phrased decree
50. See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U. S. 290, 309
1897) ; NLRB v. Swift & Co., 108 F. 2d 988, 990 (7th Cir. 1940).
51. See Eugene Dietzgen Co. v. FTC, 142 F. 2d 321, 330 (7th Cir. 1944).
52. See Bowles v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 143 F. 2d 38, 42 (7th Cir. 1944).
53. Id. at 43. See Note, 54 YALE L. J. 141 (1944).
54. Ibid.
55. See note 5 supra.
56. 332 U. S. 392 (1947).
57. Id. at 399.
58. Cf. United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U. S. 173, 186 (1944).
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an advantage: a defendant who has not been informed clearly as to the
line between the permissible and the prohibited will perhaps seek to keep
his distance from that line on the safe side and thus refrain from activity
which the government would have desired, but was unable, to have en-
joined. This "scare" effect of a nebulous decree has been judicially recog-
nized and, in some of the lower federal courts, has been regarded favor-
ably.59 Non-specific decrees have not been unusual in antitrust cases.
60
In the recent Schine Chain Theaters case, 61 however, Mr. Justice Douglas
voiced objection to the generality of an injunction against "monopolizing
first and second run films" and, remanding the case, directed the lower
court specifically to enjoin "the precise practices found to have violated
the act." 62 This would appear to be a resuscitation of the previously little-
heeded view of Mr. Justice Holmes in the earlier case of Swift & Co. v.
United States.68
Elements of an Illegal Scheme: In another respect, Swift & Co. v.
United States has been a fertile source of doctrine. Meeting the objection
made by the defendant to the complaint that the acts alleged to constitute
the violation were all lawful ones and thus ought not to be enjoined, Mr.
Justice Holmes applied the familiar common law of conspiracy and ruled
that acts which would be lawful if they stood alone could nonetheless be
enjoined if they were linked together by an illegal intent or were steps in
an illegal conspiracy.64 The early cases inquired carefully whether the
lawful activity sought to be enjoined actually was an integral part of the
illegal scheme. 65 Somewhat later, a slight variation of the doctrine was
used to justify the entire suppression of a patent licensing system which
the defendant had employed to accomplish both a lawful and an unlawful
purpose, the possibility of enjoining the unlawful use only being rejected. 66
Still later cases reveal interesting developments: It would seem that the
courts will now not scrutinize the record too closely to determine whether
all the acts proscribed by the decree were really part of the illegal scheme;
they will exercise their discretion in enjoining, with the illegal, enough
of the legal to insure the efficacy of the remedy,67 or to dissipate illegal
advantages. 68  This discretionary 69 extension of remedial scope has so far
59. See United States v. First National Pictures, 51 F. 2d 552, 554 (S. D. N. Y.
1931). Compare Note, 19 Mica. L. REv. 83 (1920) with 32 GEo. L. J. 99 (1943).
60. See, e. g., United States v. American Seating Co., 1 D. & J. 147 (N. D. Ill.
1907).
61. 334 U. S. 110 (1948).
62. Id. at 126.
63. 196 U. S. 375, 396 (1905). See also Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States,
323 U. S. 386, 410 (1945) ; United States v. Standard Oil Co., 173 Fed. 177, 192 (E.
D. Mo. 1909).
64. United States v. Swift & Co., supra note 63, at 396.
65. United States v. Reading Co., 226 U. S. 324, 371-373 (1912). On procedural
grounds the Court refused to enjoin minor combinations, withholding judgment as to
their legality, because not shown to be part of the overall illegal scheme charged. At
least one of these minor combinations was later found to be a violation of the act.
United States v. Reading Co., 226 Fed. 229 (E. D. Pa. 1915).
66. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U. S. 241, 254 (1942).
67. Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U. S. 436, 461 (1940).
68. See United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U. S. 707, 729 (1944).
69. The court is free, likewise, to allow activity, lawful if divorced from the un-
lawful conspiracy, to stand. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, 325 U. S. 797
(1945) (unconditional injunction against certain labor union activity, legal if not per-
formed in co-operation with non-labor groups, limited to apply only when so per-
formed). Cf. Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Co., 312 U. S. 287 (1941).
apparently been used only temporarily; i. e., the defendants have been left
free, after a stated period of time, to resume so much of their activity as
by itself was lawful. 0 But even in the absence of a provision making a
portion of the decree explicitly only temporary, normal equity practice
would permit the defendant to apply to the court for vacation or modifica-
tion of such of the terms of the decree as might have, after the lapse of
some time, become unwarranted. 71 If, in fact, the temporary provisions
of such decrees as those in the Bausch & Lomb and A. P.72 cases are such
that they expire automatically, the normal equity procedure just men-
tioned would seem preferable; requiring a prior application to the court,
while it has the disadvantage of placing on the court the burden of an
added hearing, provides an opportunity, all-too-rare in antitrust proceed-
ings, for preventive rather than remedial supervision and, specifically, for
an assurance that the illegal activity, which if continued would taint the
legal, has actually been abandoned. In fact, there are cases which require
only the prior application, 73 or provide, as to certain types of transactions,
for a closely-equivalent shift of the burden of proof, 74 and omit the require-
ment that a stated period of time elapse.
Dissolution and Divestiture Provisions: The cases in which the scope
of the remedy has gone farthest beyond a prohibition of merely the illegal
activity constituting the violation are perhaps those where dissolution or
divestiture provisions have been used. Such provisions are normal where
the mere existence or peculiar constitution of the defendant business unit
is itself the violation.75 Where such is the case, the court is free to direct
a reorganization of that unit by ordering partial or complete dissolution
or by directing that certain of its assets or sub-units be divested. The
guiding principle will be to create a situation "in harmony with the law,"
i. e., one where there will be free play for competitive forces.76 Thus,
interests in particular companies have been ordered disposed of,77 as have
particular operating units.78 In one case two new competing corporations
were ordered formed by the decree and the assets of the defendant were
divided among the resulting three.79 As to such provisions it would seem
to be impossible to trace any general pattern; the particular solution finally
arrived at will depend on the court's estimate of the economics of the
situation and of the disposition of the units of the business before it that
70. See United States v. Associated Press, 326 U. S. 1, 22 (1944) ; United States
v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U. S. 707, 729 (1944).
71. Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Co., 312 U. S. 287, 298 (1944).
72. See note 70 supra.
73. United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U. S. 173, 186 (1944).
74. United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U. S. 131, 148 (1948).
75. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 77-78 (1911). And see
text at note 21 supra.
76. See Hale, supra note 30, for a discussion of the major judicial reorganizations
effected, with emphasis on the economic aspects of the problem.
77. United States v. Reading Co., 272 Fed. 848 (E. D. Pa. 1921).
78. United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U. S. 173, 188 (1944).
79. United States v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 1 D. & J. 195 (D. Del.
1913). Query, whether in an oligopolistic situation a court could order part of the
assets of the one dominating company sold to its competitors. Cf. Bigelow v. RKO
Radio Pictures, Inc., 162 F. 2d 520 (7th Cir. 1947) where the court refused the
plaintiff in a triple damages suit any competitive advantage over the defendant so as
thereafter to equalize the struggle between the two. For an interesting attempt to use
the court as a lever in securing advantages over an economic rival, see United States
v. Vehicular Parking Ltd., 74 F. Supp. 4 (D. Del. 1947).
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will best conform to the policy of free competition laid down by the act.
". . . as to such provisions there is no test, ultimately, except the wisdom
of men judged by events." so
Dissolution and divestiture provisions have also been employed where
they were necessary, not in the sense that the violation of the act was the
integration of the elements of the business unit which such provisions
were designed to destroy, but in the sense that without such provisions
no effective remedy would be practically possible.8' The words "effective"
and "practical" obviously leave room for the court's discretion to be exer-
cised and one judge, at least, has indicated some of the considerations
affecting its exercise: the difficulties of proof, the delay and the cumber-
some inquiries involved in determining whether the defendant has actually
discontinued the unlawful activity (as a mere prohibitory decree would
order) ; the presently unique availability to the government of proof of
the defendants' violation and, finally, the defendant's long-demonstrated
proclivity toward violating the act.82 The relief is thus extended because
of administrative difficulties and fears that the defendant will either disobey
or be able to evade a less drastic order.
The most striking development with respect to divestiture provisions
has occurred in the series of cases evoked by the motion-picture industry.
8 3
Until United States v. Crescent Amusement Co.8 4 the courts were satisfied
to ignore past results of violations of the act committed by the defendant;
antitrust suits were not punitive, but remedial; past violations, unless they
had a continuing effect, would not deprive the defendant of the right to
conduct a lawful business in the future.8 5 In that case, however, a new
doctrine was announced: the offenders would henceforth not be permitted
to retain "the fruits" of their unlawful activity.86 In Schine Chain The-
aters v. United States 87 and United States v. Paramount Pictures 88 this
doctrine was to a large extent determinative of the disposition of the cases:
a remand to determine, inter alia, what were the fruits of the conspiracy.
The Court indicated that it regarded as illegal gains subject to divestiture
any properties acquired, or the "strategic position [of which was] main-
tained," as a result of practices which violated the act.89
80. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U. S. 131, 181 (1948) (opinion
dissenting in part).
81. See United States v. Pullman Co., 64 F. Supp. 108, 110 (E. D. Pa. 1946);
United States v. Corn Products Co., 234 Fed. 964, 1015 (S. D. N. Y. 1916).
82. See United States v. Corn Products Co., supra note 81, at 1018.
83. See Note, Judicial Regulation of the Motion-Picture Industry: The Paramount
Case, 95 U. OF PA. L. Rtv. 662 (1947), for a discussion of the antitrust problems
raised by the practices of the motion-picture industry and an evaluation of the Para-
mount consent decree.
84. 323 U. S. 173 (1944).
85. See, e. g., United States v. Standard Oil Co., 173 Fed. 177, 190, 192 (E. D.
Mo. 1909).
86. United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U. S. 173, 189 (1944).
87. 334 U. S. 110 (1948).
88. 334 U. S. 131 (1948).
89. Id. at 171. See also Schine Chain Theaters v. United States, 334 U. S. 110,
128 (1948). It is to be doubted that the standard requiring divestiture of properties,
the strategic position of which was maintained by unlawful practices, would be applied
except in a situation where, as in the cited cases, a chain of independently operating
units was involved. In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416
(2d Cir. 1945), for instance, the violation of which the defendant was found
guilty was constantly striving to maintain its at first lawful monopoly position. Id. at
429-431; if, in this situation the standard of the motion-picture cases were literally
applied, the result would be questionable. See also United States v. Paramount Pic-
tures, supra at 152, where using a lawfully acquired property as part of a conspiracy
to suppress competition is held to justify the divestiture of such property.
From a theoretical point of view, the advantages of such a standard
for divestiture are obvious: the government is almost always unable to
take effective action against antitrust violators in the incipient stages of
the violation. This is so, among other reasons, because evidence in those
stages is difficult to assemble and because the financial and personnel
limitations of the Antitrust Division dictate a canalization of effort against
more flagrant and long-continued violations. 0 In a case where the de-
fendant has, by means of unlawful practices, expanded its holdings greatly,
but not to the extent where monopoly or a restraint of trade has resulted
solely from the existence of the business unit as expanded, an order merely
to abandon the unlawful practices will permit it to profit despite the
adverse decree and thus prospectively furnish little deterrent from the
violation. Requiring the defendant to disgorge its illegal gains serves to
plug this gap in the enforcement of the act.91
To justify this standard, for which there is little support in the terms
of the act, the Court advanced an analogy to the equitable remedy of resti-
tution.oia The comparison is, however, almost wholly inapposite: Restitu-
tion is the remedy ordered where the plaintiff has conferred on the de-
fendant a benefit, or where the defendant has tortiously acquired a benefit
at the plaintiff's expense and it would be inequitable for the defendant to
retain such benefit; 91b in suits under § 4 of the Sherman Act, the aggrieved
party is the public, represented by the Attorney General, and the only
benefit conferred on the defendant by the public would seem to be the
opportunity, afforded by delay in enforcement of the act, to earn and
invest monopoly profits. Moreover, even if authority were found in the
act for surrender to the public oc of monopoly profits, whether in the form
of liquid assets or invested in further capital acquisitions, the divestiture
standard of the motion-picture cases accomplishes no such forfeiture; after
the court-ordered sale, the defendant will still retain the proceeds and
will have lost only the possible difference between the proceeds from a
non-forced, non-court-controlled sale and one judicially ordered and sub-
ject to judicial approval. In cases where the mere possession and opera-
tion of physical facilities acquired through the investment of illegal profits
do not as such amount to a violation of the act, there would seem to be no
support in the statute for, and little purpose to be served by, effecting a
liquidation of such assets by means of a divestiture decree.
Moreover, the practical administration of the standard seems fraught
with great difficulty. The district court will presumably have to inquire
specifically which properties were acquired as a result of restraints of
trade or the exercise of monopoly power and which represent normal
expansion. It will have to determine whether the "strategic position" of
any particular property was illegally maintained or whether, with respect
to that property, the defendant was merely a lawfully successful com-
petitor. Where an acquisition was partially the result of unlawful activity
and partially the result of normal expansion, there is no indication of the
course to be followed. That such determinations can be made accurately
enough to strike a balance between effective enforcement of the act and
fairness to the defendant is at least doubtful, and it would seem that a
90. See HAMILTON AND TILL, oP. cit. supra note 1, at 36-44.
91. See Schine Chain Theaters v. United States, 334 U. S. 110, 128 (1948).
91a. Ibid.; United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U. S. 131, 171 (1948).
91b. RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION §§ 1-3 (1937).
91c. Injury to individual competitors may be amply redressed in a suit for triple
damages.
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standard involving such uncertainty would be difficult to justify, on the
basis merely of enforcement difficulties. As has been pointed out, where
divestiture is necessary to create a situation in which the controls of free
competition can operate, or where it is necessary to make accompanying
injunctive provisions practically effective, the legality or illegality of the
acquisition of the properties involved is immaterial and the uncertainty and
administrative difficulties that have been noted are avoided. Where such
is not the case, however, even the consideration that the administrative
problem has been caused by the defendant would not seem to justify the
application of so uncertain a standard; better policing of decrees 9 2 and
possibly a system requiring prior approval by the Department of Justice,
or some other government agency, of acquisitions and mergers above a
stated value, would seem preferable.
93
PERSONS AND TERRITORY SUBJECT TO THE DECREE
Persons: There have on the whole been few controversies about what
persons should be subject to the terms of the decree.9 4 The courts have
proceeded, apparently with little opposition, by means of stylized formulae:
the said defendants 9. . . the defendants, their repre-
sentatives, officers, agents and servants 9 6 ". . . [the] defendants
• . . their directors, agents, servants, and employees and all persons acting
under or through them or in their behalf or claiming so to act. . . . 97 In
these formulae, however, there lurk opportunities for injustice. When a
decree is violated and contempt proceedings are contemplated, it would
seem that the proper persons to be cited would be the responsible policy-
making officials of the business, and not minor employees whose personal
economic security depends on their faithful execution of policies set by
others.98  Nevertheless, it is easier to prove a violation by the individual
actually committing it than by his superior who has either ordered it or,
with knowledge of the subordinate's activity, tacitly consented. In one
of the rare contempt citations under a Sherman Act decree, it was this
inability to prove complicity on the part of the policy-making officials that
resulted in confining the contempt proceedings to mere salesmen.99 Irre-
spective of the duties of corporate managers in normal business opera-
tions, 00 it would seem that to secure compliance with a decree, the court
might well include a provision requiring the policy-makers of the business
unit concerned to take measures to keep themselves reasonably well in-
formed of the activities of, and to insure reasonable compliance by, the
92. See HAMILTON AND TILL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 77-78.
93. With respect to mergers, a start has been made in the direction suggested by
the formation of a Merger Unit within the Antitrust Division, one of the functions of
which is to advise businessmen as to the legality of proposed mergers. Department
of Justice Release of March 19, 1947, noted in Comment, CCH TRADE REG. SERV. (9th
ed.) 1 54,126.
94. FED. R. Civ. P., 65 (d) provides that "Every order granting an injunction ...
is binding only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants, employ-
ees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation with them
and who receive actual notice of the order by personal service or otherwise."
95. United States v. Jellico Mt. Coal & Coke Co., 1 D. & J. 1 (C. C. D. Tenn.
1891).
96. United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 1 D. & J. 32 (C. C. D. N. Y. 1899).
97. United States v. General Paper Co., 1 D. & J. 75 (D. Minn. 1906).
98. See United States v. Vehicular Parking, Ltd., 56 F. Supp. 297 (D. Del. 1944).
99. See HAMILTON AND TILL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 94.
100. Ibid.; see Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 78 F. Supp. 250, 257-258 (N. D.
I1. 1948).
employees under their direction. Thus to make use of the economic
coercion inherent in the manager's power to "hire and fire" would create
a degree of discretion in enforcement officials and enable them to secure
punishment of the individuals really responsible for any contempt that
might occur.
Whether, in a case where a corporation has violated the act, the
decree should run against the corporate managers as individuals, is a
problem that also has received some attention. The usual decree will
contain the "officers-agents-employees" type formula set out above and
several cases have held this to be sufficient. 101 It would appear, however,
that those cases express merely discretionary determinations of what was
practically necessary to secure effective relief in the peculiar circumstances
there before the court; where there is a likelihood apparent that the leading
spirits of an offending corporation might seek to evade a decree of the
"officers-agents-employees" type by operating through some other business
entity, there is "eminent authority" for directing the injunction against
them personally as well.10 2
Antitrust decrees have also, both in terms and in practical effect, run
against non-defendants. They have provided, for example, that "every
person, partnership or corporation having knowledge of this decree (and
who shall engage with defendants in anything prohibited thereby) will be
guilty of violating this decree." 103 In the celebrated Debs case, the decree
read, ". . . all persons combining and conspiring with them and all other
persons whomsoever (emphasis supplied) . . ." 104 A new corporation
ordered created by the decree can be subjected to its terms from the
moment of its incorporation,1 5 as can the purchaser of assets of the de-
fendant which the court has ordered divested. 0 6 Where it is necessary
to declare a contract void, the fact that non-defendants are parties to the
contract will not bar the proposed relief, nor even justify intervention on
the part of such non-defendants. 10 7  This ability to affect the rights of
persons without formally making them parties to the suit is invaluable
where it is desired to limit the number of defendants for purposes of trial
convenience, or where the non-defendants are outside the United States
and jurisdiction over them cannot be obtained.'08
Territory: It is the cases involving international business relationships
that have raised the problem of the territorial scope of the remedy.
Although an occasional decree has specified where the particular restraint
of trade enjoined has had its effect, 0 9 the usual decree is silent as to
where its terms apply. In either case, however, references to interstate
101. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U. S. 386, 428, 433 (1945);
United States v. Pullman Co., 50 F. Supp. 123, 136 (E. D. Pa. 1943).
102. United States v. Vehicular Parking, Ltd., 56 F. Supp. 297 (D. Del. 1944),
reaff'd, 61 F. Supp. 657 (1945) ; United States v. Corn Products Co., 234 Fed. 964,
1018 (S. D. N. Y. 1916).
103. United States v. National Ass'n of Retail Druggists, 1 D. & J. 115 (D. Ind.
1907).
104. In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 570 (1895).
105. United States v. Reading Co., 273 Fed. 848 (E. D. Pa. 1921).
106. United States v. Pullman Co., 64 F. Supp. 108, 113 (E. D. Pa. 1946).
107. See National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U. S. 350, 365 (1940).
108. See Oseas, Antitrust Prosecutions of International Business, 30 CORN. L. Q.
42, 57 and n. 41 (1944).
109. United States v. Nome Retail Grocerymen's Ass'n, 1 D. & J. 86 (D. Alaska
1906) ; United States v. Federal Salt Co., 1 D. & J. 70 (C. C. N. D. Cal. 1902) (in-
junction pendente lite).
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commerce will extend the proscription territorially at least to the geo-
graphical limits of the United States and its possessions. A defendant
will thus be unable to argue, in a case where the decree is specific as to
effect of the restraint of trade, that a violation of its terms occurring or
having its effect at some place other than that specified, does not amount
to a contempt.
The Sherman Act, however, applies to the foreign commerce of the
United States as well as interstate commerce 110 and the solutions given
by the Supreme Court to jurisdictional problems "I raise the question
whether the court can control the defendant's activity in other lands. Most
of the controversies involving international arrangements have dealt with
the question of jurisdiction; 112 but in one case involving a purely domestic
conspiracy the Court had occasion to order the decree limited territorially
to this country." 3  This limitation was accompanied by no discussion, but
was apparently merely a control of the trial court's discretion, since there
would appear to be no lack of power. Given jurisdiction of the subject
matter and of the defendants in personam, such a decree can issue. 1 4
From the point of view of the court's power, moreover, it makes no differ-
ence whether the decree is negative or mandatory." 5 Where a conflict
between the requirements of the decree and foreign law is shown, the court
would doubtless hesitate," 6 although, in this situation, one court has re-
quired the defendant to apply to the foreign government for permission to
comply with the desired decretal provisions.117 As a practical matter,
however, where the court's power over the domestic participants in an
international Sherman Act violation is inadequate to effect complete relief,
agencies of the government other than the antitrust division will probably
be called into action.
ADMINISTRATIVE AND REGULATORY REMEDIES
One of the most interesting developments in the field of antitrust
enforcement is the increasing tendency for the federal courts to assume
the burdens of comprehensive planning for, and continued supervision
over, segments of the economy blighted by restrained competition. This
tendency has developed in the face of deep-rooted judicial prejudices:
courts have reached far back into American case law, seeking a justifica-
tion for renouncing duties "merely administrative in nature"; 118 they have
likewise refused to exercise functions considered legislative., 9  This atti-
110. See Note, Application of the Antitrust Laws to Extraterritorial Conspira-
cies, 49 YALE L. J. 1312, 1315 (1940).
111. Id. at 1315. Three elements are said to be necessary: "(1) a common plan or
understanding between two or more persons; (2) an overt act; and (3) personal
jurisdiction over the parties charged." An effect on American commerce, foreign or
interstate, is a sufficient overt act to satisfy (2). Id. at 1317.
112. See Timberg, Internation'al Combines and National Sovereigns, 95 U. OF PA.
L. Rxv. 575, 589-598 (1947).
113. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U. S. 386, 410 (1945).
114. The Salton Sea Cases, 172 Fed. 792 (9th Cir. 1909).
115. See F. S. Philbrick, Note, 20 ILL. L. REV. 594 (1926).
116. See Niagara Falls International Bridge Co. v. Grand Trunk Ry., 241 N. Y.
85, 94, 148 N. E. 797, 800 (1925).
117. SEC v. Minas DeArtemisa, S. A., 150 F. 2d 215 (9th Cir. 1945).
118. See United States v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 188 Fed. 127, 155 (D.
Del. 1911), citing Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 408 (U. S. 1792) and United States v.
Ferrina, 13 How. 40 (U. S. 1851). See also United States v. Paramount Pictures,
334 U. S. 131, 162 (1948).
119. See United States v. N. Y. Coffee & Sugar Exchange, 263 U. S. 611, 621
(1924).
tude is probably in accord with Congressional intent at the time of the
passage of the Act.120  Nevertheless, there has been an increasing recog-
nition that the courts, in conjunction with the Department of Justice, must
handle antitrust enforcement much as would an administrative tribunal.
With respect to the duty of adapting the broad substantive terms of the
statute to specific circumstances, this recognition is clear; 121 of more
immediate interest here is its effect on the scope of the remedy. Congress
itself has recognized that in devising a remedy, the knowledge and ex-
perience of a body of experts is necessary, and has sought to satisfy this
need in § 7 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.1 22  Most courts, how-
ever, have not seen fit to make use of that section, but instead, have devised
their decrees unassisted. 1 23  One court recently, rejecting as "too am-
bitious" the government's suggestion that the question of the decree be
referred to one of the regulatory commissions, said, ". . . the court does
not regard itself as a legislative committee or a regulatory commission;
a lawsuit has been brought, factual and legal conclusions reached, and the
relief should be that which the court can both understand and apply." 124
The parties, however, can produce expert witnesses, and the court itself,
under § 5 of the act,125 can hear all interested parties. It would therefore
be possible, if § 7 of the FTC Act is not used, for the court itself to per-
form the functions of an administrative body in framing the decree. The
desirability of such a procedure has moreover received some judicial recog-
nition.
126
Antitrust decrees, whether framed by the courts unassisted or other-
wise, have sought to regulate both the internal affairs of business organiza-
tions and their day-to-day operations. This has been accomplished by
120. See 21 CONG. REc. 2645 (1890). For a readable summary of the legislative
history of the Sherman Act, see HAMILTON AND TILL, op. cit. tzpra note 1, at 5-11.
121. See Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U. S. 553, 600 (1936) ; United
States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 370 (S. D. N. Y. 1943).
122. 38 STAT. 717 (1914), as amended, 52 STAT. 111 (1938), 15 U. S. C. §41
(1940). The FTC is empowered by that section to act as a master in chancery to
assist the federal courts in framing decrees. "These powers, partly administrative and
partly quasi judicial, are of great importance and will bring both to the Attorney Gen-
eral and to the court the aid of special expert experience and training in matters re-
garding which neither the Department of Justice nor the courts can be expected to be
proficient.
• . . the Supreme Court has never failed to condemn and to break up any
organization formed in violation of the Sherman law which has been brought to its
attention; but the decrees of the court, while declaring the law satisfactorily as to the
dissolution of the combination, have apparently failed in many instances in their ac-
complishment simply because the courts and the Department of Justice have lacked
the expert knowledge and experience necessary to be applied to the dissolution of the
combinations and the unassembling of the divided elements in harmony with the spirit
of the law." SEN. REP. No. 597, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 12 (1914).
123. The only case found where the section was employed is United States v. Corn
Products Co., 234 Fed. 964, 1018 (S. D. N. Y. 1916).
124. See United States v. Pullman Co., 50 F. Supp. 123, 136 (E. D. Pa. 1943).
125. "Whenever it shall appear to the court before which any proceeding under
section four of this act shall be pending, that the ends of justice require that other
parties shall be brought before the court, the court may cause them to be sum-
moned. . . ." 26 STAT. 210 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 5 (1940).
126. See Crosby etc. Co. v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore, 51 F. Supp. 972 (D.
Mass. 1943). "Unless we are content that the problems of antitrust enforcement be
removed . . . to administrative tribunals . . . judges must be willing to hear
from more than the conventional parties in an adversary procedure, to receive expert
suggestions from specialized governmental agencies, to accept economic testimony
appropriate for laying down a broad rule of industrial government and to frame de-
crees suited to the character of the many dimensions of the problem revealed." Id. at
974. But cf. Allen Calculators v. National Cash Register Co., 322 U. S. 137 (1944).
NOTES1948]
250 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97
requiring defendants to amend their by-laws,--in one case, for example,
so as to change the requirements for eligibility to shareholdership,
2 7 and, in
another, to directorship.12  In at least two cases the court, moved by either
geographic or "practical" considerations, has accepted a measure of
monopoly instead of ordering dissolution, and, having done so, had no
other alternative but to insure, by required by-law changes, equal treat-
ment to all applicants for participation in the use of the "monopolized"
facilities.
129
Where the internal structure of the defendant is left untouched, the
court has other means of effecting control. Power exists to appoint a
receiver 130 or "trustee," 131 either to carry out specific provisions of the
decree or to act as a standing master for an indefinite period and adjudicate
questions arising under it.'32  Where such power is not exercised, the
court itself can, and now usually does, accomplish a measure of super-
vision by retaining jurisdiction.' 33  Such a retained jurisdiction will last
until the unlawful conditions are eliminated .13 and also gives the court
power to modify the decree to fit changing circumstances.
13 Such decretal
provisions as those requiring the defendant to secure prior court approval
before taking specified actions or whereby the court itself performs an
administrative task, e. g., fixing reasonable patent royalties, are adminis-
tered under such a retained jurisdiction. However, even where jurisdic-
tion is not formally retained, there is the normal equity power to compel
obedience by punishing the defendant for contempt. Since the burden of
supervision and the institution of contempt proceedings rests on the De-
partment of Justice, it is now not unusual to aid the Department by making
use of equity's visitorial power and providing for access to corporate books
and records. 18 6
127. Continental Co. v. United States, 259 U. S. 156, 175 (1922).
128. United States v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp., 36 F. Supp. 488, 495 (D. Del.
1941).
129. United States v. New England Fish Exchange, 258 Fed. 732, 752 (D. Mass.
1919) ; United States v. Terminal Ass'n of St. Louis, 1 D. & J. 89 (C. C. E. D. Mo.
1910).
130. See Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U. S. 386, 411 (1945);
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106, 186 (1911) ; United States v.
Great Lakes Towing Co., 217 Fed. 656, 661 (N. D. Ohio 1914).
131. United States v. Union Pacific R., 1 D. & J. 207 (C. C. D. Utah 1913).
132. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in part in United States v. Para-
mount Pictures, 334 U. S. 131, 181 (1948).
133. In antitrust cases the practice began with Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
221 U. S. 1 (1911).
134. See United States v. Lake Shore Ry., 281 Fed. 1007, 1011 and n. 1 (S. D.
Ohio 1916).
135. United States v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 273 Fed. 869 (D. Del.
1921). There is authority for the proposition that the power to modify the decree is
not dependent on words of retention. See Comment, Power of a Court to Modify a
Final Permanent Injunction, 46 MicHr. L. REv. 241, 244 (1947).
136. United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U. S. 707, 728 (1944).
The provision approved read: "9. That for the purpose of securing compliance with
this Judgment, authorized representatives of the Department of Justice . . . [on
proper request] . . . shall be permitted access . . . [at proper times and after
notice] . . . to books, ledgers . . . [etc.] . . . and other records and docu-
ments in the possession or the control of the said defendants . . . relating to any of
the matters contained in this judgment, such access to be subject to any legally recog-
nized privilege. Any authorized representative of the Department of Justice, subject
to the reasonable convenience of the said defendants, shall be permitted to interview
officers or employees of said defendant . . . [provided they may have counsel pres-
ent]." Id. at 718.
SUMMARY
Under § 4 of the Sherman Act, the federal courts have of necessity
exercised a wide discretion in devising remedies. The only apparent
limitation on their power, derived as it is from the plenary federal power
over interstate commerce, is that the standards of reasonableness and
fairness of the due process clause be met. Where possible, the courts
will restrict the relief granted to an order restraining the particular activity
of the defendant which has been found to be violative of the act. To pre-
vent evasion and disobedience, however, as well as to render the relief
practically effective, the following types of extensions of the scope of the
remedy have become usual: (1) orders against activity similar to that
proven or against activity "threatened" by the defendant; (2) nebulous
injunctions; (3) orders against lawful activity that is part of an overall
illegal scheme; (4) dissolution and divestiture provisions designed to make
the relief practically effective or to deprive the defendant of illegal gains
occasioned by the impossibility of prompt enforcement of the act. Generally
decrees have run only against defendants and their agents, but there are
not infrequent departures from the general rule and non-defendants are
often either affected or directly controlled by the terms of the decree.
While in theory it is possible to control the defendant's activity outside
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, practical considerations
tend to prevent attempts so to do. Finally, more recent cases indicate a
tendency toward an administrative method of antitrust enforcement in
that (1) there is an increasing application of expert knowledge to the
problem of devising a remedy which will be effective as "a broad rule of
industrial government;" (2) antitrust decrees effectively regulate the in-
ternal affairs of business organizations; and (3) the Department of Justice
and the federal courts are exercising ever-increasing supervision of the
day-to-day operations of business associations that have failed to follow
the policy laid down in the Sherman Act.
H.G.S.
Deductibility of Non-Business Legal Expenses From
Gross Income
Legal services are often performed for clients in connection with in-
come not derived from the client's business. Whether or not the cost of
such services is deductible from gross income in determining the client's
federal income tax depends upon the application of the Internal Revenue
Code section dealing with the deduction of non-trade and non-business ex-
penses. It provides for the deduction by an individual of "all the ordinary
and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year for the
production or collection of income, or for the management, conservation,
or maintenance of property held for the production of income." 1 The
purpose of this note is to discover how this section is applied to various
types of legal expenses.
Gross income under § 22 is very broad, whereas deductions under
§ 23 are specific. Before 1942 the Code only provided for the deductibility
1. Revenue Act of 1942 § 121, 58 STAT. 798, 819 (1942). This is INT. REV. CODE
§23 (a) (2).
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of business expenses, 2 perhaps due to a Congressional feeling that the
point was covered.3 Under a liberal interpretation of the term "trade or
business," furthermore, deductions were allowed for some seemingly non-
business expenses.4 However, a conflict developed as to this construction,
which was resolved in Higgins v. Commissioner 5 by holding that "non-
business" and "investment" expenses were not deductible under § 23(a).
This result-that non-business income may not be reduced by expenses in
producing it-was contrary to one of the basic principles of income taxa-
tion-that only net income should be taxed.6 To remedy the situation,
§ 121 of the Revenue Act of 1942 (adding § 23(a) (2) to the Internal
Revenue Code) was passed, allowing deduction of non-business expenses
from gross income.
7
To be deductible, non-business legal expenses 8 must meet the follow-
ing statutory requirements: first, they must be ordinary and necessary.9
This does not mean usual or frequent but rather reasonably necessary as
a matter of good judgment 10 iti collection or management of non-business
income. Legal expenses are almost always held to be "ordinary and neces-
sary," except where paid for another's benefit, or where paid in connec-
tion with making a gift." Second, they must be connected with either
the production or collection of income, or with the management, conserva-
tion or maintenance of property held for the production of income.'1 2  Ac-
cording to Treasury Regulations, income means that which, if and when
realized, will be included in taxable income. Thirdly, it may not be a
capital expenditure,13 or it will be considered a cost of the property; nor
2. Now INT. REv. CODE §23(a) (1).
3. This is fortified by the fact that it was so considered by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue. See Brodsky & McKibbin, Deduction of Non-Trade or Non-Business Ex-
penses, 2 TAx L. REv. 39, 40 (1946).
4. Ibid.
5. 312 U. S. 212 (1941).
6. See McDonald v. Comm'r, 323 U. S. 57, 66 (1944) (dissenting opinion).
7. H. R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1942) ; 1 Hearings before Com-
mittee on Ways and Means, Rev. Revision 1942, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 155 (1942).
8. "Legal expense" as used in this note means "cost of legal services," and does
not mean those expenses that are "permitted by law."
9. It must be an ordinary and necessary expense, "paid or incurred in the taxable
year." This latter requirement, however, is primarily a mere question of fact in each
case and will not be discussed in this note. Note that the requirement of "ordinary
and necessary" applies also to business expenses.
10. Comm'r v. Heininger, 320 U. S. 467 (1943) ; Harry Kanelos et al., P-H 1943
TC MEm. DEC. SERV. 1143,429 (1943) (lawyer fees deductible where hired lawyer by
one unable to read or write English to help collect sweepstakes winnings). See also
4 MERTENS § 25.07. The courts do not usually discuss the Regulations definition, which
is "reasonable in amount," and "proximately related to collection or management" (see
note 12 infra). But see per contra: Charles N. Manning, 3 TC 853 (1944), aff'd, 148
F. 2d 821 (6th Cir. 1945) ; Harry Kenelos et al., supra, where, however, there was an
element of extortion.
11. Nancy Reynolds Bagley, 8 T. C. 130 (1947) (Acq.) ; Frank M. Cobb, 10
T. C. 380 (1948). The expense is a cost of the gift.
Possibly another exception is the cost of making a settlement. H. F. Wilcox et
al., P-H 1944 TC MEm. DEC. SERV. 1144,012 (1944). However, the settlement was in
connection with illegal stock deals, so that the public policy feature makes this a dubi-
ous precedent on the ordinariness and necessity of expenses.
12. SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 86 (1942). See also U. S. Treas.
Reg. 111, § 29.23(a)-15 (1943).
13. INT. REv. CODE § 24(2). See also U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.24-2 (1943);
U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23(a)-15 (1943).
may it be a personal expense.14 Implicit in these three requirements is
that the expense must be related not only to income (rather than capital)
but to taxable income.
PRODUCTION OR COLLECTION OF INCOME 15
Must income actually be produced or collected for an expense to be
one of collection or production of income? The early cases said yes, in-
terpreting the statute strictly.16 A more liberal trend is exemplified by
the Tax Court in Hyman v. Josephs.17  The Court said: "There is no
reason why the term 'production or collection of income' should be con-
strued any more narrowly or strictly than the term 'management, con-
servation, or maintenance of property held for the production of in-
come'. . . . Any expense which would be deductible under § 23 (a)
(1) if the taxpayer's activities amounted to the carrying on of a trade
or business is deductible under § 23(a) (2) where the activities do not
quite measure up to a trade or business but nevertheless were embarked
upon by the taxpayer with the expectation of realizing income or profit." 18
(Italics supplied) Thus, the test applied was whether there was an
effort to collect, actual collection not being considered necessary. 19
However, on appeal, the circuit court reversed,20 saying that it is not
sufficient that an expense be incurred in connection with an income-produc-
ing activity. In so narrowly construing the act the court espouses the
view that to come within § 23 (a) (2) it is necessary actually to produce
income, and a mere effort to produce is inadequate. In view of the pur-
pose of the statute the effort to collect rule is more realistic. Just as in
business, the process of securing non-business income is not always suc-
14. INT. REV. CODE §24(1). See also U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.23(a)-15 (sport,
hobby or recreation).
15. Production and collection are apparently synonymous, with the latter the more
popular term. However, there are a few cases holding expenses deductible solely on
the basis of being production expenses: James S. Flyd, P-H 1943 TC MEre. DEC.
SERv. § 43,421 (1943) ; Cynthia Kuser Herbst, P-H 1943 TC MEm. DEC. SERV. f 43,309
(1943) ; see Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in McDonald v. Commissioner, 323 U. S. 57,
66 (1944).
Some general examples of production or collection expenses are found in: Pierce
Estates, Inc. et al., 3 T. C. 875 (1944) (Acq.) (litigation involving royalties) ; Jack
Rosenzweig et al., 1 T. C. 24 (1942) (Acq.) (litigation involving infringement of a
copyright); Mary Geary, 9 T. C. 8 (1947) (Acq.) (litigation by life beneficiary of
trust to have carrying charges paid from principal instead of interest); Charles N.
Manning, 3 T. C. 853 (1944), aff'd, 148 F. 2d 821 (8th Cir. 1945) (litigation arising
out of a sale of stock) ; and Harry Kanelos et al., P-H 1943 TC MEm. DEC. SERV.
ff43,429 (1943) (legal advice in collecting sweepstakes winnings).
16. Estate of Edward W. Clark, 2 T. C. 676 (1943) (Acq.) ("no income pro-
duced or collected"); H. F. Wilcox et al., P-H 1944 TC MEm. DEC. SERV. fr44,012
(1944).
17. Hyman Y. Josephs, 8 T. C. 583 (1947).
18. Id. at 588. This is the doctrine of Bingham v. Comm'r, 325 U. S. 365 (1945),
discussed p. 256 infra, which the Tax Court here extended to the production or collec-
tion clause.
19. It is interesting to note that Justice Black, dissenting in McDonald v. Com-
missioner, 323 U. S. 57, 66, also expressed the opinion that an effort to produce income
is sufficient, that the decision in that case was 5-4, one member concurring only in
the result, and that two of the majority are no longer members of the court. See also
U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.23(a)-15 ("income if and when realized"); H. R. REP.
No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) ("In the pursuit of income").
20. Comm'r v.,Josephs, 168 F. 2d 233 (8th Cir. 1948).
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cessful, but both successful and unsuccessful outlays are expenses of the
total income that is collected.
2 1
With the Tax Court's holding in the Josephs case a trend to the effort
to collect doctrine had been established. But with the circuit court's re-
versal, the question has been plunged into some confusion. The circuit
court, however, has espoused the view which had been followed in most
cases previously. A typical example is litigation involving a fiduciaiy's
right to commissions. Whether this is an expense of collecting his com-
missions, which are taxable income, has usually depended on whether the
fiduciary was successful. For example in the Josephs case, the circuit
court thought that the fiduciary's legal expenses were not incident to in-
come collection since he had been unsuccessful (he made a settlement).
Furthermore, in Commissioner v. Heide,22 the expense of settling a suit
brought against the fiduciary for mismanagement was held not to be a
collection expense.23  Of course, where the litigation is successful there is
no question of its deductibility. Thus in Annie Laurie Crawford 2 4 a suc-
cessful defense against an attempt to be removed as co-executor and co-
trustee was held to be an expense of collection of past and future executor's
fees. The court so held in spite of the fact that since she was the prin-
cipal beneficiary of this large estate (about $15,000,000) the primary rea-,
son for the defense was probably to maintain control as executor and
trustee.25  Therefore, it would seem that the rule as to expenses of
fiduciary's fees requires the fiduciary to be successful in the litigation, and
actually to collect his fees. If the fiduciary were in the business of acting
as such (e. g. corporate trustees) litigation involving his right to com-
missions would probably be considered a normal business expense, with-
out regard to his success therein. In both situations the expenses, suc-
cessful or not, are incurred in connection with the total income received
in a given period.
25a
21. As a corollary to the effort to collect rule, it has been held that it is not neces-
sary that all the income produced by the litigation be realized in the current taxable
year for the entire legal expense to be deductible in that year. Stella Elkins Tyler,
6 T. C. 134 (1946) (Acq.); Annie Laurie Crawford, 5 T. C. 91 (1945) (Acq.) ;
Estate of Bartholomew, 4 T. C. 349 (1944), appeal dismissed, 151 F. 2d 534 (9th Cir.
1945). All these cases partly involved the right to collect in the future. Note, how-
ever, that in these cases the litigant was successful. See also U. S. Treas. Reg. 111,
§ 29.23(12)-15 (1943) ("may realize in later years"). Similarly, legal costs of re-
taining income obtained in prior years is deductible from current gross income. Harold
K. Hochschild, 7 T. C. 81 (1946), rev'd on other grounds, 161 F. 2d 817 (2d Cir.
1947) (dividends) ; William A. Falls, 7 T. C. 66 (1946) (Acq.) (royalties); Annie
Laurie Crawford, supra (fees) ; Estate of Bartholomew, supra (earnings).
22. 165 F. 2d 699 (2d Cir. 1948).
23. See also Samuel E. Jacobs, P-H 1943 TC Mza. DEc. SERv. 143,170 (1943).
Cf. Estate of Edward W. Clark, 2 T. C. 676 (1943) (Acq.), where, however, lack of
proof was the influential factor.
Note that although the Josephs, Heide, and Jacobs cases seem to be in accord, the
Josephs case is clearly distinguishable from the others. In Heide and Jacobs there
was a "moral order" not present in the Josephs case: the fiduciary made the payments
before judgment, while in Josephs it was made after a judgment favorable to the
fiduciary. Thus the Heide and Jacobs payments were more akin to "admissions of
guilt," while the Josephs payment appeared to be a mere "purchase of peace."
24. 5 T. C. 91 (1945) (Acq.).
25. Furthermore, she had previously renounced her right to trustee's fees. The
court said nothing about her function as trustee or about her renouncing those fees.
25a. This consideration would seem to dictate a following of the "effort to pro-
duce" rationale in cases like the Josephs case in view of the Supreme Court's pro-
nouncement in Bingham v. Comm'r, 325 U. S. 365 (1945) that the "business" and
"non-business" provisions of § 23 (a) were in pari materia. See discussion p. 256 infra.
See also note 18 supra, and note 31 infra.
Again, with regard to litigation involving a claim to property in
another's hands, the courts seem to steer away from the effort to collect
concept. Where the litigation is successful and there is an actual collec-
tion the expense has been allowed. For example in Stella Elkins Tyler,26
a life tenant of a trust brought suit for construction of the will setting it
up, in order to get a larger share of the income. She won, and the legal
cost was allowed as a collection expense here on the theory that she
acquired no new rights by the litigation, but merely used it as one step
in collecting what already belonged to her, this being merely a will con-
struction proceeding. Similarly, in William J. Garland,27 the cost to tax-
payer of arranging favorable settlement of a suit to reform a trust, based
on fraud in the inducement, was allowed as an expense of collection.
What he received by settlement was his all the time, said the court since
he alleged fraud in the inducement, even though payment was not made
as result of a decree adjudging this allegation in his favor. However, in
C. C. McClees 28 the expense of an unsuccessful effort to collect was not
allowed as a collection expense. Here, a guardian did not succeed in
having a supposed grandaughter declared not to be a beneficiary of the
trust under which his ward was a life tenant. The court said he made
a claim to property he neither owned nor used, and expenditures incurred
in an unsuccessful attempt to acquire property are personal. However,
the guardian was not asserting title to the corpus, which would remain
the same, but was merely after additional income for his ward. Fiduciaries
often must initiate proceedings to obtain income they believe belongs to
their cestui. Therefore, no sound basis appears here either for the success
of the litigation being a prerequisite to their deductibility.
29
It now appears that actual collection of income is necessary and the
effort to collect doctrine has been discarded, with some vestiges only re-
maining in scattered cases. It is felt that this does not properly reflect
the Congressional purpose in enacting § 23(a) (2), because all outlays
in connection with production of income are an expense of whatever in-
come is collected. Moreover, fishing expeditions at the expense of the
federal revenues could be prevefnted by a more flexible criterion. It would
seem, therefore, that an amendment is called for, or, perhaps, a ruling by
the Supreme Court,80 who, it is felt, would espouse the effort to produce
rule in view of their interpretation of the statute in the case of Bingham v.
Comm'r.3 1
Quite apart from the effort to collect approach, the expense of
collecting tax-exempt income is not allowed as a deduction under
§23 (a) (2). Since such income is not includable in gross income the
expense of collecting it should not perhaps be a deduction from gross
income. Yet, such an expense is deductible if the collection is made in a
trade or business.32 If by legislative grace such a deduction is to be al-
26. 6 T. C. 135 (1946) (Acq.).
27. P-H 1943 TC MEm. DEC. SERV. 1143,339 (1943).
28. P-H 1945 TC MEm. DEC. SERV. 1145,019 (1945).
29. See Diamond, Current Decisions on Non-Trade and Non-Business Deductions,
4 Axmx. INsT. oN FED. TAXATION 722, 731 (1945). See also Kohnstamm, Executor
v. Pedrick, 66 F. Supp. 410 (S. D. N. Y. 1946), discussed p. 258 infra.
30. In the Josephs case the taxpayer petitioned for certiorari (Aug. 16, 1948) but
the petition was later dismissed on his own motion (Oct. 18, 1948).
31. 325 U. S. 365 (1945), discussed infra. See also notes 18, 19, and 25a, supra.
32. INT. REV. CODE § 24(a) (5) disallowed deduction for expense of tax-exempt
income, but excepted interest. When § 23(a) (2) was added, § 24(a) (5) was changed
so that the expense of tax-exempt interest was also not deductible as to non-business
income, while remaining deductible as to business income.
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lowed at all, it might in all fairness be allowed as a non-business expense
also. Therefore, it is felt that a change by Congress is called for in this
provision of the Code.
MANAGEMENT, CONSERVATION, OR MAINTENANCE OF PROPERTY HELD
FOR THE PRODUCTION OF INCOME 
3 3
The requirement alternative to production or collection of income is
that the expense be for the management, conservation, or maintenance
of property held for the production of income. "Property held for the
production of income" covers stocks, bonds, and real estate, even if it is
never expected to produce any income but held merely to "minimize a
loss." 34 However, it does not include real property held in connection
with a hobby or as a residence,3 5 or a chose in action in the form of a
claim for unliquidated damages.
36
Until 1945, the expense of advice and litigation with regard to the
tax liability of an individual was non-deductible under § 23(a) (2), ex-
cept for so much as was allocable to recovery of interest.37 . In 1945, the
Supreme Court interpreted the meaning and scope of management ex-
penses, in the famous case of Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner.38 The
trustees had deducted legal fees for (1) unsuccessfully contesting a tax
deficiency, (2) advice regarding the payment of a cash legacy, and (3)
advice on tax and other problems of expiration and distribution of the
trust. It was argued these were not management expenses because the
period of managing the trust was over and it was being distributed. The
Tax Court held the expenses to be costs of management of the trust, but
the circuit court reversed. The Supreme Court, in holding them de-
ductible as management expenses, said: (1) trust property is held for
the production of income until the entire distribution is completed; (2) dis-
tributing the income during the period of the trust, and the corpus at the
expiration of the trust are equally duties of the trustee; and (3) dis-
tribution is a management function. Thus these expenses were incurred
in the course of managing property which was still held for the produc-
tion of income. In one of the most important and far-reaching phases
of its opinion, the Court held it is not necessary for the expense to result
in actual production of income. It said, "Section 23 (a) (2) . . . per-
mits deductions of management expenses . . . even though the par-
ticular expense was not an expense directly producing income." 39 The
33. Here again, the words "management," "conservation," and "maintenance" are
practically synonymous, with "management" the most frequently used. In this note,
"management" will be used as a shorthand expression for the entire clause "manage-
ment, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of income."
There are some cases, though, resting solely on "conservation." James A. Connelly, 6
T. C. 744 (1946) (Acq.) ; Truman H. Newberry et aL., P-H 1945 TC MEm. DEC.
SERV. 11 45,196 (1945).
34. James A. Connelly, supra note 33; Howard E. Cammack, 5 T. C. 467 (1945).
See also U. S. Treas. Reg. 111 Supp., § 29.23(a)-15 (1944).
35. J. H. Walker, P-H 1943 TC MEm. DEC. SERV. 143,524 (1943), aff'd, 145 F. 2d
602 (6th Cir. 1944).
36. Helvering v. Stormfeltz, 142 F. 2d 982 (8th Cir. 1944).
37. Stoddard v. Comm'r, 141 F. 2d 76 (2d Cir. 1944) ; Don A. Davis, 4 T. C. 329
(1944), aff'd, 151 F. 2d 441 (8th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U. S. 783 (1946) ; John
W. Willmott, 2 T. C. 321 (1943) (Acq.). Accord: U. S. Treas. Reg. 103,
§ 19.23(a)-15 (1941).
38. 325 U. S. 365 (1945).
39. Id. at 374.
Court was, however, speaking of management expenses, and the one at-
tempt so far to extend this doctrine to collection expenses has proved
unsuccessful. 40
The Court also made it clear that the purpose of the statute was to
put individuals with a non-business income on an equal footing, with re-
gard to deductions, with those having a business income. The Court said
that "section 23(a) (2) is comparable and in pari inateria with
§ 23(a) (1)." This has led to the frequent and helpful practice of first
determining whether an expense would be deductible if the transaction
had resulted from being in business, and if so, holding the expense de-
ductible as a non-business outlay,41 since all other requirements are the
same.
Shortly after the Bingham decision, the Tax Court decided the case
of Howard E. Camnmack.42  Cammack paid taxes on worthless stock, and
brought suit for a refund. Legal fees therefor were held deductible as a
management expense.
In view of the Bingham and Cammack cases, the Treasury Regula-
tions were changed to include as deductions all expenses paid or incurred
by an individual in the determination of income tax liability.43  Income
tax litigation expenses are now considered management expenses when
they cover tax advice, preparing returns, representation on adjustments
and settlements with taxing authorities, resisting proposed deficiency
assessments, and suits for tax refunds. As such they are deductible 44
without regard to whether the underlying transaction relates to the pro-
duction of income or management. It is true that such an expense might
not be proximately related to management and still be held deductible.
It has been suggested, however, that the Regulations are justifiable on the
ground of administrative expediency, in view of the probability that in
most cases such proximate relationship is present.45
However, when it comes to legal expenses in connection with gift
taxes, the courts and Regulations take a different view. Such expenses
are a cost of making the gift.46 They are not a cost of management of
property held for the production of income, "except to the extent such
expenses are allocable to interest on a refund of gift taxes," which would
of course be includable in gross income.
47
40. Hyman Y. Josephs, 8 T. C. 583 (1947), rev'd, 168 F. 2d 233 (8th Cir. 1948).
See discussion .supra under COLLECTION.
41. This is helpful because cases on business expenses have been coming up since
about 1916, whereas non-business expense cases only since 1942. The Supreme Court
iself used this technique in the Bingham case, reasoning from Kornhauser v. United
States, 276 U. S. 145 (1928), that had the trust been a business the expense would be
deductible because it was directly connected with the enterprise; therefore, it is de-
ductible -as a non-business expense since it meets the management test.
42. 5 T. C. 467 (1945).
43. T. D. 5513, 1946-1 CuM. BULL. 61. In the Bingham case the court held in-
valid that part of the U. S. Treasury Regulations, see note 37 supra, which limited
tax litigation deductible expenses to that part allocable to interest recovered.
44. E. g., Williams v. McGowan, 152 F. 2d 570 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Norbert H.
Wiesler, 6 T. C. 1148 (1946), aff'd, 161 F. 2d 997 (6th Cir. 1947) ; Philip D. Armour,
6 T. C. 359 (1946) (Acq.).
45. Brodsky & McKibbin, Deduction of Non-Trade or Non-Busness Expenses,
2 TAx L. REv. 39, 64 (1946).
46. Nancy Reynolds Bagley, 8 T. C. 130 (1947) (Acq.) (no proximate relation
between disposition of income-producing properties by gift and management or collec-
tion) ; Frank M. Cobb, CCH FED. TAX REP. Dec. 16,269 (TC 1948).
47. T. D. 5513, 1946-1 Cum. BULL. 61 (1946).
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As to property taxes, legal expenses are deductible only if the prop-
erty taxed is held by the individual for the production of income during
the period of the tax.
4 s
In addition to tax litigation, the legal costs incurred by a fiduciary
in the performance of duties of administration is often regarded as normal
management expense. In Kohnstamm, Executor v. Pedrick,49 an in-
competent's committee petitioned for instructions as to the propriety of
electing to take against the will of their ward's wife. The proceeding
was pursuant to a statutory mandate. No deduction was taken, the in-
competent died, and the executor brought this action to recover the tax.
It was held the refund should be made since this was a necessary duty of
administration in managing the ward's property. The expense was not
considered a "capital item" 49a because the proceeding was for instruc-
tions only and was not asserting a right to property. Similarly, a
guardian's defense in litigation seeking to reach the estate of a minor has
been held a duty of management and the expense deductible as such.50
With regard to estate planning, legal costs were held deductible as
management expenses in Nancy Reynolds Bagley.51 Estate planning in-
volves both bettering the income position of the taxpayer, and the
transfer of his property.52 Since most of the planning is probably directed
toward the latter objective, and since expenses incident to the transfer of
property are not deductible, 58 the allowance of such a deduction is perhaps
questionable.
CAPITAL EXPENDITURES
It is clear from the general purpose of the Act that capital expedi-
tures are to be considered an additional cost of the property and were
intended to remain non-deductible to individuals with a non-business in-
come. Although they may be depreciated or taken into account to determine
capital gains or losses, the courts have consistently held they are not de-
ductible as non-business expenses. 54 This is in accord with the Bingham
reasoning that § 23(a) (2) is in pari materia with § 23(a) (1), since
capital expenditures are clearly not deductible as business expenses.
48. Id. at 62.
49. 66 F. Supp. 410 (S. D. N. Y. 1946) ; ef. Trust of Amy McHenry, CCH FED.
TAx REP. Dec. 16,009(M) (TC 1948).
49a. See discussion under CAPITAL EXPENDITUREs infra.
50. Estate of Bartholomew, 4 T. C. 349 (1944), appeal dismissed, 151 F. 2d 534
(9th Cir. 1945). Management exp.enses have also been held to include the legal cost
of terminating a trust [Cynthia Kuser Herbst, P-H 1943 TC MEM. DEC. SERV. f 43,309
(1943)], setting up a trust [Trustees of Series Q, Group Certificates, 2 T. C. 990
(1943)], defense of a breach of contract action arising out of negotiations for the sale
of stock [William P. Toms, P-H 1946 TC MEam. DEC. SERV. 1146,062 (1946)], and
advice regarding rearrangement of income-producing property [Nancy Reynolds Bag-
ley, 8 T. C. 130 (1947) (Acq.)]. But it is clear that management (or conservation)
does not mean the defense of any suit merely because a judgment lien might have at-
tached that would have had to be satisfied out of income-producing property. Com-
missioner v. Kenan, 145 F. 2d 568 (2d Cir. 1944) ; see also U. S. Treas. Reg. 111,
§29.23(a)-15, as amended, by T. D. 5513, 1946-2 CUM. BULL. 61 (1946).
51. 8 T. C. 130 (1947).
52. Both cases relied upon in the Bagley case apparently concerned only the fees
of investment counsel for current investments and not for transfer of property. And
in the Bagley case life insurance and testamentary trusts as well as inter vivos trusts
were included in the estate plan.
53. Such an expense is a cost of making the gift. See note 46 supra.
54. E. g., Bowers v. Lumpkin, 140 F. 2d 927 (4th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 322
U. S. 755 (1944) ; James C. Coughlin, 3 T. C. 420 (1944).
Certain types of expenditures are plainly capital in nature, such as
expense of purchasing and perfecting title,55 litigation claiming an in-
heritance (which would not be includable in gross income),r 6 and legal
expense of reacquiring premises upon forfeiture by the lessee.5 7 However,
one of the most vexing problems at present is whether the legal costs
incident to disposition of income-producing property is a "capital item"
or a non-business "expense." If the former, it would be taken into ac-
count only to determine capital gain or loss in the particular transaction.
If a non-business expense it would be a deduction from gross income. The
problem arises because taxpayers try to have the transaction treated as
a capital gain or loss (where the holding period is over six months),
while it the same time treating the legal fees involved in the transaction
as a non-business expense and deducting it from gross income; i. e. treat
part of the transaction as a capital item and part of the transaction as
an expense. The earliest case allowed the cost of disposing of property
as a non-business expense.58 Then, in Walter S. Heller,59 the Tax Court
held the legal costs of a statutory proceeding for disposition of stock to
be a non-business expense also. Again in 1944, in Margery K.
Megargel60 the expense of disposal of stock by means of settlement for
cash was allowed as a collection expense, the Commissioner acquiescing
in this view. However, in Helvering v. Storrnfeltz6l the Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit squarely held the expense of disposition of
property for cash to be a capital expenditure. And in a 1947 memo
opinion, the Tax Court followed the Stormfeltz decision. 2
The Floyd, Heller and Megargel cases might be said to exemplify
a liberal tendency to extend non-business deductions, and interpret the
statute broadly as a remedial measure. However, it is clearly settled that
selling costs are not business expenses, but are to be set off against the
sales price to determine capital gains or losses; 1 and the non-business
expense section is in pari materia with the business expense section.64
Furthermore, these disposition expenses are clearly attributable to a par-
ticular transaction involving specific property. Thus it would seem that
55. Ernest Smith, P-H 1946 TC MEm. DEC. SEnv. 146,009 (1946) (clearing title
to stock).
56. Edmunds v. United States, 71 F. Supp. 29 (E. D. Mo. 1947) ; B. M. Spears,
CCH FED. TAx REP. Dec. 15,684(M) (TC 1947). IN?. REv. CODE § 22(b) (3) pro-
vides that a gift, bequest, or devise is not includable in gross income unless it is income
from property. Regarding this exception, in C. C. McClees, P-H 1945 TC MEM. DEC.
SERV. 143,019 (1945) a claim for income from a testamentary trust was not allowed
because unsuccessful. On the other hand, in Stella Elkins Tyler, 6 T. C. 135 (1946)
(Acq.), expense of a similar claim, but successful, was allowable, the court saying it
was not a claim to title, for petitioner already had title.
57. Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. United States, 61 F. Supp. 451 (E. D. Mo.
1945).
58. James S. Floyd, P-H 1943 TC MEat. DEC. SERV. 43,421 (1943).
59. 2 T. C. 371 (1943), aff'd, 147 F. 2d 376 (9th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 325 U. S.
868 (1945). The statute involved in the underlying transaction provided that a share-
holder dissenting to a merger is entitled to fair value of his shares assessed by the
court.
60. 3 T. C. 238 (1944) (Acq.) ; cf. Charles N. Manning, 3 T. C. 853 (1944), aff'd,
148 F. 2d 821 (6th Cir. 1945) (indirect effect of disposition, tax litigation, allowed as
collection expense).
61. 142 F. 2d 982 (8th Cir. 1944).
62. Thomas A. Kane et al., CCH FED. TAx REP. Dec. 15,657(M) (TC 1947).
63. Spreckels v. Commissioner, 315 U. S. 626 (1942).
64. Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U. S. 365 (1945). See discussion
smpra under MANAGEMENT.
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they are logically no more than a capital item to be taken into account
in determining capital gain or loss. Besides, although it may be desirable
to take this expense out of the class of capital items, it would be unfair
to allow it as a deduction to those with a non-business income and not to
those with a business income. 65
Another type expense generally considered a capital expenditure is
the cost in connection with defense of title to propeity.66 This includes,
for instance, the defense of an action to invalidate a sale of stock,67 and
the defense of a statutory proceeding for the perpetuation of testimony
in connection with a claim to property.68 But: "the line of demarcation
between an 'ordinary and necessary expense' as a deductible item and
an expenditure incurred in defense of title to property and therefore
not deductible is extremely narrow. In fact, in some of the cases it ap-
pears to have been drawn on an arbitrary rather than on a basis of reason
or logic." 69 Consequently, it seems that where the court can treat the
defense of title aspect as secondary and the primary purpose qualifies, the
expense will be deductible.70 Similarly, it has been held not to be de-
fense of title to defend litigation seeking to reach a ward's estate. 7' On
the whole, however, in proceedings involving the question of legal title to
specific property, the chances of success in getting a non-business de-
duction for the litigation expense are decidedly against the taxpayer.
72 ,
The defense of title rule has been severely criticized, 73 especially in view
of the fact that in producing income and in managing income-producing
property, many of the usual expenses partake of the nature of capital
expenditures. 74  No reason appears, however, for treating defense of title
expenses differently merely because they are connected with non-busi-
ness income instead of business income, and it does not mean that a
change in judicial attitude is called for as to non-business defense of title
expenses, nor have the courts been willing to make any such distinction. 75
Nevertheless, a reinspection of the defense of title rule as applied to both
non-business and business income might well be made by Congress. 6
65. For a variant treatment and somewhat opposite conclusion, see Nahstoll, Non-
Trade and Non-Business Expense Deductions, 46 MicH. L. REv. 1015, 1024 (1948).
66. Bowers v. Lumpkin, 140 F. 2d 927 (4th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 322 U. S. 755
(1944) ; William A. Falls, 7 T. C. 66 (1946) (Acq.). The regulation in connection
with non-business expenses is U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.23 (a) -15.
67. Bowers v. Lumpkin, supra note 66.
68. James C. Coughlin, 3 T. C. 420 (1944).
69. Rassenfoss v. Commissioner, 158 F. 2d 764, 786 (7th Cir. 1946).
70. Hochschild v. Comm'r, 161 F. 2d 817 (2d Cir. 1947), reversing, 7 T. C. 81
(1946) (defense of title was "secondary") ; Rassenfoss v. Comm'r, 158 F. 2d 764 (7th
Cir. 1946), reversing, P-H 1945 TC MEm. DEC. SERV. 1145,338 (1945) (defense of
title was "incidental"). Although both these cases dealt with business expenses, the
principle applies to non-business expenses as well. See also Everett, Deductibility of
Legal and Accounting Fees, 6 ANN. INST. oN FED. (INcoME) TAXATION 616 (1948).
71. Estate of Bartholomew, 4 T. C. 349 (1944), appeal dismissed, 151 F. 2d 534
(9th Cir. 1945). But see dissent, at 362.
72. See Everett, supra note 70, at 636.
73. See Everett, supra note 70; Note, 34 CALIF. L. REv. 212, 216.
74. Ibid.
75. Note that while veering away from the strict application of the defense of title
rule (see note 70 supra) the court was dealing with business expenses, and was not
using the non-business section as a means of escaping the rule. The courts handle the
defense of title problem in the same manner without regard to whether the expense
is business or non-business.
76. See Everett, supra note 70.
Similar to the treatment of capital expenditures, a personal expense
is not thought of as connected with taxable income, and therefore is not
deductible from gross income.1 7  However, in connection with non-busi-
ness income the personal expense problem is not very important, nor often
dealt with by the courts.
7 8
ALLOCATION
Allocation is a problem not peculiar to non-business expenses but
presenting some particularly difficult aspects therewith. It arises when
litigation or an attorney's bill covers several issues, only some of which
may afford a basis for deduction of the legal costs as non-business ex-
penses. The difficulty is in allocating the expense to the deductible and
non-deductible items. It is a well-known and frequent practice for at-
torneys' fees to be paid on a calendar or other basis, without accounting
for each item of advice or litigation. Should the taxpayer, then, lose the
benefit of the entire deduction because he cannot prove proper allocation?
Clearly the burden rests upon the taxpayer to show that his claimed
deduction falls within those provided for by statute.7 9 The courts have
disallowed many expenses because of a failure of pleading and proof of
allocation, often admitting that part of the expense might be deductible.80
In Williams v. McGowan 81 this was done where the underlying suit in-
volved recovery of taxable interest and non-taxable principal. Both
amounts were fixed by court decree, so a percentage allocation of the
expenses of the suit would have been simple, but the court required an
affirmative pleading and a showing of the percentage of interest recovered.
In James Lewis Caldwell McFaddin,8 2 however, the court held that the
77. INT. REv. CODE § 24(a) (1). See also U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.23(a)-15
(1943).
78. Only two cases were found turning on personal expenses in connection with
non-business income, and both are only memo decisions. In Louise F. Levy et al.,
P-H 1942 TC MEm. DEc. SERV. 1142,645 (1942), expense of disbarment was held to
be personal; however, the court's reliance on "considerations of public policy" makes
it a doubtful precedent. In G. C. McClees, P-H 1945 TC MEM. DEC. SERV. 1 42,019
(1945), an attempt to acquire property was held to be personal. By I. T. 3856, 1947-1
Cum. BULL. 23, legal expenses of alimony increase are to be treated as personal, but
there have been no cases on the point. Yet, periodic alimony payments are includ-
able in gross income of the wife by § 22(k) [and deductible from gross income of the
husband by § 23 (u)]. The result of the regulation thus may be that the wife cannot
deduct expenses in producing taxable income (and the husband cannot deduct expense
of deductible alimony). The regulation is based on two opinions not in point because
they involve defense of a post-nuptial agreement and not increases in alimony. Be-
sides this distinction, both were decided before the 1942 Act, when courts often
called non-business expenses "personal." See Diamond, Deductions-Non-Trade or
Non-Business, 3 ANN. INST. ON FED. TAXATION 241, 258 (1945). It is submitted,
therefore, that the wife's legal expenses in connection with an increase in alimony
might well be treated by the courts as non-business expenses (and husband's expense
is a part of the cost of alimony).
79. Hord v. Commissioner, 143 F. 2d (6th Cir. 1944).
80. Sayers F. Harman, 4 T. C. 335 (1944) (Acq.); Donald V. Smith, CCH
1947 FED. TAX REP. 1 15,808(M) (TC 1947) ; James S. Floyd, P-H 1943 (TC MEM.
DEC. SERV. 1143,421 (1943); Claire S. Strauss, P-H 1943 TC MEm. DEc. SERv.
1143,217 (1943). In the Smith case the court said, "But even assuming that some of
the above activities might be considered of such character as to permit a deduction
for legal expenses connected therewith, there is no evidence as to what portion of Such
legal fees are properly or even approximately attributable to activities having such a
character (italics supplied)."
81. Williams v. McGowan, 58 F. Supp. 692 (W. D. N. Y. 1944), rev'd on other
grounds, 152 F. 2d 570 (2d Cir. 1945).
82. James Lewis Caldwell McFaddin et al., 2 T. C. 395 (1943).
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fees should be apportioned pro rata between amounts received as prin-
cipal and interest.83 Applying this percentage theory of allocation, the
court in Harold K. Hochschild 84 determined the amount of principal and
interest involved and arrived at a percentage, apparently without it being
pleaded by petitioner. The court thus refused to let failure of pleading
prevent the allowance of a deduction. In the Bagley case 85 the court
derived the percentage deductible for one fee (telephone advice) from the
other fees charged for the respective deductible and non-deductible mat-
ters. In the Falls case 86 the percentages were based respectively on the
value of patents (non-deductible capital item) and the amount of royalties
sued for (deductible collection expense).
Thus the trend seems to be in favor of saving that part of the expense
allocable to non-business income. The allocation difficulty is hurdled by
applying a percentage theory, whether or not the actual percentage'is
pleaded, provided of course, that facts are present from which the court
may ascertain such a percentage. It has been suggested that where the
litigation is unsuccessful the deduction must fail because of the adminis-
trative difficulty of proving allocation, since it is not known what the
litigant would have recovered.8 7 It is submitted that the lack of success
should not make an insuperable difficulty. First, if the recovery would
have included interest, an allocation is possible by using the following
formula:
Deduction (x) Legal Interest Rate (6%)
Actual Legal Expense Principal + Interest Sought
This in effect is exactly what the courts do in the case of successful liti-
gation.8  Secondly, where claims to property are involved, the percentage
deductible could be determined either from the valuations placed on the
property in the underlying litigation or from the values proved by taxpayer
before the Tax Court.
Any strict attitude with regard to a showing of allocation would
result in requiring lawyers to itemize bills: (1) as to charges for each legal
service rendered, and (2) as to parts of recovery sought or collected (e. g.,
principal and interest). In view of the prevailing practice not to item-
ize, and the practical difficulty from the attorney's standpoint, it seems
there is justification for a judicial attitude of leniency as exemplified by
the percentage theory of allocation as it is presently used, plus the extension
suggested.
CONCLUSION
Section 23(a) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code was added by the
1942 Act, as a remedial measure to allow for deduction of expenses in-
curred in connection with taxable non-business income. The courts, how-
83. Accord: Samuel Thorne, P-H 1944 TC MEss. DEC. SEv. 44,323 (1944) ;
Cynthia Kuser Herbst, P-H 1943 TC MEs. DEC. SERV. 143,309 (1943) ; Percival E.
Foerderer, P-H 1943 TC MEm. DEc. SERV. 143,102 (1943).
84. 7 T. C. 81 (1946), ree'd on other grounds, 161 F. 2d 817 (2d Cir. 1947).
85. Nancy Reynolds Bagley, 8 T. C. 130 (1947) (Acq.).
86. William A. Falls, 7 T. C. 66 (1946) (Acq.).
87. Brodsky & McKibbon, Deduction of Non-Trade or Non-Business Expenses,
2 TAx L. REv. 39, 44 (1946).
88. E. g., in Helvering v. Stormfeltz, 142 F. 2d 982 (8th Cir. 1944), recovery was
some $94,000 principal and $136,000 interest. The court said that interest represented
136/230 of the recovery or 59%.
ever, are not fairly adapting it to its purpose. Factors of success and
even public policy 89 are considered, and a legal expense must be connected
with actual collection of taxable non-business income in order to be de-
ductible. In so doing the courts are not taking a realistic attitude and
are refusing to recognize the practical fact that although not every expense
incurred in an effort to collect income is successful all such expenses are
nevertheless a cost of obtaining whatever income taxpayer is successful in
collecting. It is true that the Supreme Court in the Bingham case has
taken this realistic approach, but it has so far been limited to those ex-
penses fitting into the management provision. This is all the more re-
grettable because there is no real distinction between "collection" and
"management." When it is determined an expense is deductible, it is then
(actually as a mere matter of description) placed by the court in one of the
two main statutory categories: production or collection of income; or,
management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the produc-
tion of income.
If the entire amount is not deductible as a non-business expense the
courts will attempt to allow the part allocable to § 23(a) (2). The method
is to pro rate in accordance with- the amount of non-business income in-
volved in the underlying transaction. On the other hand, if the litigation
is connected with title, it is a capital expenditure and no more deductible
as a non-business expense that it would be as a business expense.
Thus the statute is only partly interpreted to allow individuals to
deduct legal expenses incurred in accumulating non-business income
pursuant to the basic precept of income taxation that only net income be
taxed.
F.J.A.
Some Perpetuities Problems Under the Pennsylvania Estates
Act of 1947
With the Estates Act of 1947,1 Pennsylvania becomes the first to
attempt a realistic approach to the Rule against Perpetuities. The rule has
been the source of many controversies some of which are so basic that
they put in issue the accuracy of the generally accepted expression of the
rule that "no interest is good unless it must vest if at all, not later than
twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest." 2
However, it is not our purpose to become embroiled in such discussions
nor to indulge in a historical dissertation on the development of the rule.
89. Although the "penalty" has already been fully imposed by the underlying
transaction itself (see Note, 54 HA~av. L. REv. 852, where the rule is severely criticized
on this basis), it may be that the courts feel this additional sanction is also helpful as
a preventive, especially where a large deduction is involved.
1. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20, §§ 301.4, 301.5 (Purdon, Supp. 1947).
2. GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, § 201 (4th ed. 1942). But see 2 SIMES,
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 490 (1936) : "A perpetuity arises from a serious indirect
restraint on alienation which may continue for more than a life or lives in being and
twenty-one years after the creation of the interest involved; non-vested future inter-
ests and limitations which make private trusts indestructible are indirect restraints
within the meaning of the rule." Simes feels that the rule applied to non-vested future
interests and the rule applied to indestructible private trusts are one and the same and
not merely two analogous rules as Gray contends.
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Our primary objective is to present the changes brought about by the
Act and to illustrate some of the problems which might foreseeably arise
under it.
DETERMINATION BY ACTUALITIES
Section 4 provides that no interest shall be void as a perpetuity except
"upon the expiration of the period allowed by the common law rule against
perpetuities as measured by actual rather than possible events, any interest
not then vested and any interest in members of a class the membership of
which is then subject to increase shall be void." 3 This section is not
intended to eliminate the common law rule but rather to allow more prac-
tical results to be achieved under it.4 It is, therefore, apparent that some
discussion of the common law background is essential to a clear under-
standing of the Act.
The feature of the rule that has received the most criticism is that it
concerns itself solely with possibilities.5 This has given the rule an aura
of fantasy which flies in the face of modern science and established business
practice. Thus, the possibility that a woman aged seventy might have
children,6 that a war might last more than twenty-one years, 7 and that a
will probate may not be completed in twenty-one years 8 have resulted in
gifts being declared invalid. "The justification for such a rigid adherence
to logical possibilities . . . in the application of the rule lies in the in-
creased certainty which is thereby secured. . . . the interest in question
may ordinarily be said to be either bad or good from the time of its crea-
tion; and one is not compelled to wait in uncertainty for the turn of sub-
sequent events or for a judicial guess. . . ." 9 While this argument is
valid in other jurisdictions which determine the validity of the limitation
of the time of audit, it is not applicable in Pennsylvania. In McCaskey's
Estate 10 the court stated, "the application of the rule to a status not now
existing should be determined . . . when it becomes necessary so to do
and not before then." For that reason they refused to determine the valid-
ity of the ultimate remainders. Although some doubt was cast on this
statement," it was generally followed 12 and in Quigley's Estate 13 the
court held that the validity of the remainders would not be decided at the
audit. Since then an unbroken line of decisions have affirmed this rule.14
3. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20, § 301.4 (Purdon, Supp. 1947).
4. REPORT-DECEDENT'S ESTATE LAWS OF 1947, 72.
5. For example, see Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARv. L. Rv. 638
(1938).
6. Jee v. Audley, 1 Cox Eq. Cas. 324, 29 Eng. Repr. 1186 (1787).
7. Re Engals, [1943] 1 All Eng. 506 (Ch.)
8. Johnson v. Preston, 226 Ill. 447, 80 N. E. 1001 (1907). But cf. Belfield v.
Booth, 63 Conn. 299, 27 Atl. 585 (1893). (Distribution to be made fourteen years
after settlement of estate held valid.)
9. 2 SIMES, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 496 (1936).
10. 293 Pa. 497, 507, 143 Atl. 209, 213 (1928).
11. Scott's Estate, 301 Pa. 509, 152 Atl. 560 (1930). The court there determined
that the ultimate remainder was invalid and intimated that the issue was not properly
raised in McCaskey's Estate.
12. Lockhart's Estate, 306 Pa. 394, 159 Atl. 874 (1932) ; Warren's Estate, 320 Pa.
112, 182 Atl. 396 (1936).
13. 329 Pa. 281, 198 Atl. 85 (1938).
14. Wanamaker's Estate, 335 Pa. 241, 6 A. 2d 852 (1939) ; Uch's Estate, 338 Pa.
396, 12 A. 2d 905 (1940) ; Reed's Estate, 342 Pa. 54, 19 A. 2d 365 (1941) ; Yewdall's
Estate, 343 Pa. 478, 23 A. 2d 460 (1942) ; Lauck's Estate, 358 Pa. 369, 57 A. 2d 855
(1948).
It might be expected that the enunciation of this doctrine would result
in a relaxation of the rigidity of the rule but no such trend has as yet been
indicated. The courts have continually reiterated that the purpose is to
defeat the intent of the testator, not to determine it.15 Of course, whether
or not the rule makes void a limitation often depends on the construction
put upon the limitation by the courts and it is not surprising to find that
where a will is ambiguous the courts will adopt the construction which
will not offend the rule. 16 But while in such cases the courts will presume
that the testator intended a valid gift they have shown no inclination to re-
write the decedent's will merely because he has made an invalid disposition.
Thus it is clear that the Pennsylvania courts had eliminated the sole pur-
pose for using possibilities as a test for remoteness without a corresponding
elimination of any of the less desirable features of the rule.
With the law in this state one can imagine the embarrassment facing
an attorney who must explain to the remainderman at the end of the
period that he will receive nothing because something which in fact didn't
happen might have happened. In this situation legislative action was
dictated and two approaches were" possible. One would have required
the courts to rule on the validity of all limitations at the time of the audit
thus eliminating the doctrine of Quigley's Estate and restoring the earlier
common law procedure. The alternative was to follow Quigley's Estate
but also to require that the ultimate determination of the validity of the
interests be based on actualities rather than possibilities. The legislature
adopted the latter course.
Without a doubt the new act adds realism to our property law by
reducing, if not eliminating, the use of the much criticized conclusive pre-
sumptions of the common law. 1 7  The rarity with which the presumed
event actually occurred is indicative that such irrebuttable presumptions
are unfounded. It is not contended that these presumptions will be en-
tirely eliminated. Situations may yet arise which will result in their use.
For example: testator leaves Blackacre to A for life then to the first born
daughter of A for her life with a gift over to the daughter's children. When
testator dies A has no children but a daughter (D) is born in 1950. A, the
sole measuring life, dies in the year 2000 and D is still surviving in 2021
when the period of the rule expires. At that time D has three children
but by the terms of the Act as well as common law the maximum member-
ship of the class must be fixed within the period or the whole gift fails.
In order to determine whether the maximum membership is fixed, the
court must decide whether D, now aged 71, is capable of having more
children. This can be resolved either by the common law presumption of
capability of issue or by medical testimony. The adoption of the latter
view would certainly be in accord with the general legislative scheme and
15. "Whenever the rule against perpetuities applies, it always operates to defeat
the intention of the donor or testator . . . ; hence the true construction of a deed or
will must be ascertained without reference to the rule itself." Scott's Estate, 301 Pa.
509, 512-13, 152 Atl. 560, 561 (1930). See also: Friday's Estate, 313 Pa. 328, 334,
170 At. 123, 126 (1933) ; Barton v. Thaw, 246 Pa. 348, 364, 92 At. 312, 316 (1914);
Coggin's Appeal, 124 Pa. 10, 29, 16 Atl. 579, 581 (1889).
16. Shepard v. Union & New Haven Trust Co., 106 Conn. 627, 635, 138 At. 809,
813 (1927) ; In re Stickney's Will (Docketed as Congregational Church Bldg. Soc.
v. Everett), 85 Md. 79, 101, 36 Atl. 654, 655 (1897) ; Coggin's Appeal, 124 Pa. 10, 29,
16 Atl. 579, 581 (1889) ; Colt v. Industrial Trust Co., 50 R. I. 242, 245, 146 Atl. 628,
630 (1929).
17. For a discussion of the typical cases see Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51
HARv. L. Rzv. 638 (1938).
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the intent of the draftsmen 18 as well as established medical science but
in view of the fact that the statute is intended to disturb the common law
as little as possible 19 the courts may be reluctant to adopt such a broad
interpretation. Thus although such cases will be rare, the ultimate decision
as to whether improbable possibilities remain a part of our law rests with
the courts.
While it is extremely desirable that the law be approached prag-
matically, it must also maintain a degree of certainty and stability. Many
of our activities are predicated upon the "knowne certaintie of law" and
nowhere is this more true than in the field of wills and trusts. The com-
mon law rule rendered the law certain but it does not follow that a fortiori
the statute renders it uncertain. A testator may achieve the same degree
of certainty by observing the common law rule but at the same time he
may apply his practical knowledge of the facts to avail himself of the
benefits of the Act. If he adopts the latter course, by including an alternate
gift over in the event that the interest does not vest within the period of
the rule he will avoid the risk of the remote possibility occurring and de-
feating his intent. Thus Pennsylvania has combined certainty and realism
in the law of perpetuities.
DISPOSITION OF INVALID INTERESTS
Another innovation in the fields of perpetuities law is the disposition
of invalid interests prescribed in § 5.2o This section provides that (1) a
valid interest following a void interest shall be accelerated; (2) a void
interest following a valid interest on condition subsequent shall vest in the
owner of the valid interest; and (3) any other void interest shall vest in
the person entitled to the income at the expiration of the period of the rule.
Prior to the passage of this act, void gifts were treated the same as
lapsed gifts and either fell into residue or passed to the settlor's heirs or
next of kin as of the date of his death.2 1 Such a rule failed to recognize
the difference in the two situations. Often a will discloses a scheme of
equality of distribution between two branches of the testator's family. If
there is a lapse as to one branch it is fair to assume that the testator would
desire the whole gift to go to the other and the law disposes of it accord-
ingly.22 However if, in the same situation, the ultimate limitation to one
branch is too remote while the other is valid, the share of the one branch,
with the possible exception of a life estate, is wholly diverted to the other.
18. "By regarding actualities at the end of the period, the unrealistic results based
on purely theoretical possibilities are avoided." REPORT-DEEDFNT'S EsTATEs LAWS
OF 1947, 72.
19. Section 4 "is intended to disturb the common-law rule as little as possible, but
to make actualities at the end of the period, rather than possibilities as of the creation
of the interest, govern. . . ." Ibid.
20. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20, § 301.5 (Purdon, Supp. 1947).
21. Before McCaskey's Estate, 293 Pa. 497, 143 Atl. 209 (1928) was decided
there was a marked tendency to declare the whole gift invalid if the limitation over
failed. E. g., Feeny's Estate, 293 Pa. 273, 142 AtI. 284 (1928) ; Ledwith v. Hurst,
284 Pa. 94, 130 Atl. 315 (1925) ; Lilley's Estate, 272 Pa. 143, 116 At]. 392 (1922) ;
Geissler v. Reading Trust Co., 257 Pa. 329, 101 At. 797 (1917); Kountz's Estate
(No. 1), 213 Pa. 390, 62 At. 1103 (1906) ; Johnston's Estate, 185 Pa. 179, 39 At. 879
(1898). Such a result was manifestly unfair to the holders of otherwise valid inter-
ests. It is believed that the decision in Quigley's Estate, 329 Pa. 281, 198 At. 85
(1938) resulted in part from a desire to break away from such practice.
22. The Wills Act of 1947, § 14(8), (9), (10), PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20, § 180.14
(Purdon, Supp. 1947). This is substantially a re-enactment of former legislation in
respect to lapsed gifts.
Had the testator been apprized of this invalidity it is reasonable to believe
that he would have desired the ultimate interest to vest at an earlier date
in order to maintain the original ratio. 'The Act reaches this result, thus
providing for an equitable distribution more in accord with the testator's
probable intent. Of course, in rare cases the application of this statute
will bring about a purely arbitrary result but certainly it will be no more
arbitrary than that which formerly prevailed.
FORESEEABLE PROBLEMS FACING THE JUDICIARY
It might be expected that, in view of the practical advantages of this
statute, similar legislation might be found in other jurisdictions and that
judicial interpretation of such statutes would be available to guide the
Pennsylvania courts. However, although twenty-five states have statutes
or constitutional provisions dealing with perpetuities, none has adopted
the Pennsylvania approach. 28 Thus the courts will have neither precedent
nor authority to aid them in interpreting this act. We shall consider here
three problems most likely to require their special attention, bearing in
mind that many of the common law rules utilized in the determination of
perpetuities questions must still be applied to limit the free use of discre-
tion by the courts. The rule has been made more flexible but it has not
as yet been reduced to a rule of construction.
The Measuring Lives: It has been suggested that the statute raises
a new problem in defining lives in being. The argument is that in using
the "possibilities" test only those lives which affected the vesting of the
interest needed to be considered, but under the "actualities" test all lives
become significant.2 4 The fallacy of such an argument is found in the
fact that actually two questions are involved: first, Who are the measuring
lives, and second, Are they a sufficiently definite group so that the death
of the last survivor may be readily ascertained? The common law imposed
no limit as to who might be the measuring lives 25 except that the death
of the last survivor must be capable of determination by competent testi-
mony.26 Such a limitation is necessary to prevent the estate from being
consumed in fruitless investigations. The statute provides that "upon the
expiration of the period allowed by the common law rule . . . any interest
not then vested . . . shall be void." The plain meaning of that language
is that the period should be measured in the same manner as it was prior
to the Act. Certainly, the courts, on such language, will not abandon a rule
of such practical value.
23. Ala., Ark., Ga., Iowa, Ky., Md., Nev., N. M., N. C., Ohio, Tenn., Tex., and
Wyo. merely restate the common law while Ariz., Cal., D. C., Idaho, Ind., Mich.,
Minn., Mont., N. Y., N. D., Okla., S. D. and Wis. have adopted statutes aimed di-
rectly at the suspension of alienation. The New York statute, N. Y. REAL PROPERTY
LAW § 42, is typical of the latter group providing that: "Every future estate shall be
void in its creation, which shall suspend the absolute power of alienation, by any lim-
itation or condition whatever, for a longer period than during the continuance of not
more than two lives in being at the creation of the estate." The period allowed by
these statutes varies from two lives in being in Mich., Minn., and N. Y. to lives in
being plus thirty years in Wis.
24. 60 HAv. L. REv. 1174, 1175 (1947).
25. "For let the lives be never so many, there must be a survivor, and so it is but
the length of that life [for Twisden used to say, the candles were all lighted at once]."
Scattergood v. Edge, 1 Salk. 229, 91 Eng. Rep. 203 (K. B. 1699).
26. "The language of all the cases is, that property may be so limited as to make
it unalienable during any number of lives, not exceeding that, to which testimony can
be applied, to determine, when the survivor of them drops." Thelluson v. Woodford,
11 Ves. 112, 146, 32 Eng. Rep. 1030, 1043 (Ch. 1805).
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Years in Gross: A somewhat related problem may arise where there
is a gift to A for fifty years in trust for X with a gift over at the termina-
tion of the trust to an unascertained class. At common law the gift over
is unquestionably bad 27 either because the fifty year period can only be
considered in gross or because all the measuring lives might die today
leaving only the period in gross. Under the common law such a distinc-
tion was unnecessary but under the statute it becomes a primary issue.
If the term must be measured in gross, the statute will not save the gift
but if the trustee and beneficiaries now living may be measuring lives, the
validity of the gift over will depend on their longevity.
Because this distinction was not essential to the ultimate decisions, it
was rarely made 28 and the courts might well be expected to treat the issue
de novo. Any such consideration must necessarily bring into play the
overriding policy of the Rule against Perpetuities to defeat indirect re-
straints on alienation. This would appear to dictate that the period should
be considered in gross, yet such a result would be unnecessarily harsh.
The law has established that an interest may remain contingent for the
duration of lives in being plus twenty-one years without being violative
of the purpose of the rule and in the absence of a clear expression of intent
to the contrary the full period should be allowed.
Nor does the use of the longer period impair the rigidity of the rule
for it is well settled that "where two constructions are reasonably possible,
if one will sustain the gift and the other will not, the former interpretation
will be accepted." 29 Such is the case here. Normally, the persons named
in the gift may be measuring lives and the testator by a slightly different
wording could have made it clear that he wished the longer period to
apply.30 Merely because he was ill advised he should not be punished.
If the period is too long, then the rule as a whole should be changed but
inroads should not be made merely because a testator has employed a
faulty draftsman.
Class Gifts: In the vast majority of complex limitations the gift over
is to a class whose members are not determinable until some future date.
For that reason it is essential that any statute concerning perpetuities be
explicit on this point if a labyrinth of vexing litigation is to be avoided.
Unfortunately, the Pennsylvania statute is not.
Section 4(b) provides that "any interest in members of a class the
membership of which is then [at the expiration of the common law period]
subject to increase shall be void." Such a statement fails to distinguish
between the closing of the class and the vesting of the interest in the
members of the class. In the normal situation, where there is a technical
vesting in the members on or before the closing of the class, the statute is
adequate. For example; where the testator leaves his property to A for
life and then to A's children absolutely, each child as he is born takes a
vested interest subject to open to let in later born children. When A dies
the class closes and at that time both the maximum and minimum member-
27. E. g., Lilley's Estate, 272 Pa. 143, 116 Atl. 392 (1922) ; Johnston's Estate, 185
Pa. 179, 39 Atl. 879 (1898).
28. The sole statement by the Pennsylvania courts on this point is found in Johns-
ton's Estate, 185 Pa. 179, 184, 39 Atl. 879, 880 (1898) : "If an absolute term is taken
and no anterior term for a life in being is referred to, such absolute term cannot be
longer than twenty-one years."
29. Scott's Estate, 301 Pa. 509, 513, 152 Atl. 560, 561 (1930).
30. "For fifty years but no longer than twenty-one years after the death of the
last beneficiary living at my death," would achieve this result. Cf. Friday's Estate,
313 Pa. 328, 170 AtI. 123 (1933).
ship is determined; the exact amount each member will receive is fixed.
In this situation the closing of the class does result in the "vesting" of the
gift for purposes of the Rule against Perpetuities. The problem arises
under the statute where the gift does not vest in all the members at or prior
to the closing of the class--i. e. where the gift is contingent-for while at
common law the class closed when it could no longer increase, the Rule
against Perpetuities was not satisfied unless both the maximum and mini-
mum membership were established within the period of the rule, and the
exact share of each member was thus fixed. A simple illustration involving
this problem may be stated thus: a bequest to A for life, then to such of
the children of B who attain the age of twenty-five. The gift to B's
children remains contingent on their reaching twenty-five.31 When testator
dies B has one child, X, age twenty-seven. Five years later both A and
B die and B leaves surviving him three children, X now thirty-two, Y four
and Z two. X, the sole surviving measuring life, dies one year later.
Hence, when the period expires, Y and Z are respectively twenty-six and
twenty-four. There is no doubt that the class closed when A died; 32
that but for the Rule against Perpetuities X and Y satisfied the condition
and thereby acquired transmissible interests; and that Z's interest remains
contingent. On these facts what disposition of the property should be made
under § 4(b), the plain meaning of which would seem to be that if the
class has not closed by the end of the period the gift is void? Since the
class is closed the negative implication from § 4(b) would appear to
validate the gift but distribution presents a problem capable of several
solutions.
It might be argued that there are two classes, one composed of all
of B's children and the second composed of those who have attained
twenty-five. The latter class will not close until all living children have
reached that age. Therefore the gift is void and A's heirs take under
§ 5(c). This reasoning though completely contrary to common law prin-
ciples reaches substantially the same result. The effect of such an argu-
ment is that the class may not close until all interests are vested, and it
completely ignores the fact that the closing of the class and the vesting of
the interest involve two separate principles.33
If we assume the Act to mean that the closing of the class vests all
the interests for the purpose of the rule a different result is reached. The
condition of age then becomes a condition subsequent and at the termination
of the period is stricken off as too remote. Thus all the children share.
This equally distorts the law of class gifts. In the first instance the closing
of the class was made dependent on the interests vesting and here vesting
is made dependent on the closing of the class.
Two other solutions are foreseeable. It might be said that the closing
of the class fixes the amount each will receive if he satisfies the condition.
Thus, X's heirs and Y will each receive one-third but Z's interest is void
and falls to the holder of the last valid interest. This would appear to be
A but it can be argued that since X and Y hold valid interests they are
entitled to this share despite the fact that their interest is concurrent
with Z's invalid interest. Either of these results require that the valid
and void interests be separated, but, since Leake v. Robinson,34 the courts
have steadfastly refused to split a class gift. Thus it is clear that legalistic
31. Coggin's Appeal, 124 Pa. 10, 16 Atl. 579 (1889).
32. 2 SimEs, LAW OF FuTuRE INTERESTS, § 378 (1936).
33. 2 id. §§ 371-395 (1936) with special reference to § 371 and § 389.
34. 2 Mer. 363, 35 Eng. Repr. 979 (Ch. 1817).
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dogma will not answer this problem; some rule of property must give way,
and this being true, a sound result must depend on the public interests
involved.
The sole justification for granting the interest to A's heirs is that such
a result conforms to the common law as modified by § 5 of the Act. The
policy of the rule requires that the interest be vested in someone at the
expiration of the period and the statute aims to make that "someone"
conform to the testator's intent. Assigning the interest to A's heirs would
be purely arbitrary and while an arbitrary result is sometimes necessary,
it should be avoided whenever possible. Thus, the issue resolves itself
into which of B's children should share.
No strict rule should be laid down as to whether Z should share with
his brothers. We are concerned with what the testator intended or, more
accurately, what he would have intended had he been aware of the in-
validity. This can only be determined by an examination of the instru-
ment and the surrounding circumstances. However, whenever a problem
of construction arises certain presumptions are necessary as an aid to the
courts. In the situation where age is the condition it would seem that the
testator would prefer to abandon the condition rather than the gift. The
testator was, in all probability, motivated by a desire to protect the children
from the follies of their youth but he would not wish to protect them out
of their interests. On the other hand, if the gift is in the nature of a
reward-e. g., to those children of B who graduate from law school-the
condition would appear to dominate the gift and only those who satisfy it
should share. Only by deciding whether the gift or condition predominates
can a reasonable answer be reached. The presumption in such cases should
be founded on this basis.
CONCLUSION
The Pennsylvania Estates Act has removed the Rule against Per-
petuities from its medieval armor and placed it in a modern setting. In a
field of law where realism has been generally sacrificed to achieve certainty
the statute has attained both. However, if the spirit of the Act is to pre-
vail, the rigidity of the rule must be relaxed. This step rests with the
courts but we submit it is a short step and one in keeping with the pro-
gressive attitude prevalent in other fields of the law.
W. F. L., Jr.
